**Pathways to Inclusion?**

**Social Movement Approaches to Building Solidarity in the Context of Diversity**

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**Abstract:** Social movements have adopted a wide variety of approaches to building and maintaining solidarity across social divisions (such as race, gender, ethnicity and religion), to varying degrees of success. Some scholars have offered models or ideals for individual activists to follow to avoid complicity in these relations of domination but few have undertaken to conceptualize and assess the range of approaches to diversity that social movements do or could employ. This paper offers a conceptual framework that systematizes a set of distinct approaches to building political solidarity in the context of diversity, and develops specific hypotheses about the impact of these different approaches on movement persistence and political success. Drawing on a set of illustrative cases of social movements, we examine the degree to which movements embody the various approaches we identify— namely, active solidarity, pop-up solidarity, drive-by solidarity, and universal deliberative solidarity. We trace the impact of these different models of solidarity on organizational and political outcomes. These analyses generate theoretical insights into efforts to build diverse and inclusive political communities.

**Introduction**

Divisions of race, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, and religion have become ever more salient as the nations of the world confront challenges relating to immigration and refugee flows, economic crisis and dislocation, and environmental degradation. Building political solidarity across racial, ethnic, and gender categories is a critical goal for communities seeking to address these challenges, since non-violent contestation in civil society is critical for prompting progressive policy change (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Piven and Cloward 1993; Santoro 2008,2015; Htun and Weldon 2012; Weldon 2011). However, the basis for that solidarity can seem elusive. How do social movements overcome challenges related to domination and distrust among their adherents, given the power asymmetries between them?

Social movements have adopted a wide variety of approaches to building and maintaining solidarity across these social divisions, to varying degrees of success (Einwohner 1999; Raman 2010; Greenwood 2008; Polletta 2004; Weldon 2006). Some scholars have offered models or ideals for individual activists to follow to avoid complicity in these relations of domination (e.g., Gawerc 2012; Hancock 2011; Rai 2018; Tormos 2017) but few have undertaken to conceptualize and assess the range of approaches to diversity that social movements do or could employ. This paper offers a conceptual framework that systematizes a set of distinct approaches to building political solidarity in the context of diversity, and develops specific hypotheses about the impact of these different approaches on movement persistence and political success. Drawing on a set of illustrative cases of social movements in the U.S. and around the world, we examine the degree to which movements embody the various approaches we identify— namely, active solidarity, pop-up solidarity, drive-by solidarity, and universal deliberative solidarity. We trace the impact of these different models of solidarity on organizational and political outcomes. These analyses generate theoretical insights into efforts to build diverse and inclusive political communities, a pressing question for contemporary political science (Hero 2016).

## Diversity and Inclusion in Social Movements

Some scholars see diversity as a political resource (e.g., Young 1990), and argue that attending to intersectionality – the ways one or more dimensions of difference overlap or interact –in social movement organizing and activism can strengthen political influence (Hancock 2016; Tormos 2017; Weldon 2006; 2011). But most scholars argue that greater diversity represents challenges for social movement success and political action. In fact, research suggests that political organizations with heterogeneous constituencies face greater challenges in mobilizing politically due to potentially competing interests and preferences (see, e.g., Przeworksi and Sprague 1986). Political scientists and sociologists who study social movements point to the empowering role of identities, organizations, institutions and other connective ties, but diversity itself is rarely seen as a strength (Meyer et al. 2005; Tarrow 1998; Reger et al 2008; Staggenborg 2011; for exceptions see Tilly 1978; Weldon 2006). For most social movement scholars, increasing diversity and multiple identities among adherents, such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and North-South divisions, are seen as significant challenges (Gitlin 1995; Snow and McAdam 2000; Echols 1989; Beckwith 2000; Smith 2008). How do activists overcome these challenges? And, why do some fail? Few have systematically examined the various approaches activists apply to these challenges. Until now, no one has examined the consequences of these different approaches for social movement outcomes such as organizational persistence and political influence.[[2]](#footnote-2)

We argue that different kinds of solidarity lead to distinct political outcomes and we begin to delineate those different forms of solidarity and their consequences. Specifically, more inclusive, difference-affirming forms of solidarity are more likely to sustain movements over the long term, and ensure broader political impact. We also note that in the short-term, less inclusive forms of solidarity may be as workable or even more powerful, as when short-term, purposive, and narrowly-defined (i.e., in terms of limited goals) movements may have substantive but short-term impacts. This high-impact form of solidarity is less sustainable over the long term. Last, we argue that suppressing difference and emphasizing similarity as a strategy for building cooperation, without the effort to counter internal power differentials, may allow narrow organizations to persist, but these organizations lack vibrancy and have little impact. We also highlight the role of repression in shaping both the form of organizing and the likelihood of political success.

Diversity can mean different things to different people. In this paper, we use diversity in the *critical diversity* sense, meaning that increasing or attending to diversity means more than ensuring mere difference: It means attending to social groups that are systematically silenced and excluded by broader societal relations of domination and oppression (Herring and Henderson, 2011; Young 1990; 2000). Most social movements are diverse to some degree (including, for example, differences in gender, sexuality, religion, or race/ethnicity). Differences within activist ranks create power asymmetries that can lead to domination and distrust (Gawerc 2012).

Valuing critical diversity means more than ensuring that many different kinds of people are present.[[3]](#footnote-3) Our approach focusses on countering the relations of domination that subvert deliberation and other forms of communicative democracy (Habermas 1987, 1989; Young 2000). Communicative democracy emphasizes coordinating political behavior through communication and persuasion—the only force being the force of the better argument—rather than through bureaucratic rules, economic payoffs or imperatives, or the threat of violence. Marginalized groups must have a voice in social movement deliberations. This requires intentional action to counter *intersectional* marginalization, that is, marginalization that is due to the combination of more than one social structure (Hancock 2016; Collins and Bilge 2016; Strolovitch 2007). When marginalized groups have a voice, identities formed by the intersection of multiple social structures (for example, Black women, or Latinas) can serve as a basis for a stronger solidarity, rather than a liability or basis for division (Hancock 2016; Tormos 2017; Weldon 2006).

What do we mean by solidarity? Solidarity is widely proclaimed in songs, slogans, and speeches, but what it means to be *in solidarity* is more often assumed than explained. Solidarity is relevant not just for social movements, but also for governments, political parties, religious authorities and international organizations. We define solidarity as the ties between social groups, their ability to act in concert, to cooperate, and act together in pursuit of social change.

Some definitions of solidarity presume a common interest or kinship that undergirds coordinated action, but we define political solidarity in a way that is more agnostic about bases of cooperation. At a basic level, solidarity is a form of intentional coordinated action, when some groups or individuals are motivated to coordinate their behavior with others. Solidarity becomes **political** solidarity when it pertains to “the activity through which relatively large and permanent groups of people determine what they will collectively do, settle how they will live together, and decide their future, to whatever extent this is within their power” (Pitkin 1981, 343). When groups seek to coordinate their political behavior, we see this as evidence of political solidarity. This can mean sharing resources, symbolic action, or designing programs to mutual benefit.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Solidarity, or coordinated political action, can range from the passive (refusing to take action that would run counter to others’ stated positions - for example, honoring a picket line) to active (engaging with others to jointly define political projects and purposes through a deliberative process). Solidarity also varies in terms of the thickness of the relationship that is sought: Is it a temporary, provisional, bounded solidarity that is the aim, or is it a longer-term political alliance based on shared values or identities, relationships of trust and reciprocity? Is it relatively spontaneous or intentional? Characterized by different combinations along these dimensions, we expect social movements to have varying consequences for diversity and inclusion, and thereby for organizational persistence and movement success over the longer terms, as shown in Table 1.

**Approaches to Solidarity, Pathways to Inclusion: Responding to Difference and Dominance**

Our question in this paper is how movements respond to diversity and how this affects their political effectiveness and persistence. How should organizations respond to diversity in order to maximize its benefits? The literature on the organizational benefits of diversity emphasizes that diversity does not always have benefits – the benefits depend on the ways that organizations respond. For example, Page (2008) shows that diverse groups are better at problem-solving and are more creative. But these benefits depend on group processes that allow diverse members to contribute to discussions and share their ideas. When some groups are silenced or excluded, or if collaboration is merely formal, with dominant people unilaterally making all the decisions, the benefits of diversity will not be realized. Similarly, some scholars argue that diversity is a political resource, providing a wider set of experiences on which to base political decisions and creating a broader set of groups who can potentially be drawn into political action. These benefits can only be enjoyed, however, if the organizational practices of the movement ensure that diverse groups feel included, symbolically and substantively (Weldon 2006; Young 1990).

Some have argued that the most strategic path for political mobilization is to emphasize universal elements of actors’ identity, or to avoid identity politics altogether (Lilla 2017). Social psychological research has shown that appeals to more universal identities can strengthen political support for social solidarity in the form of support for social programs (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Others have argued that a sort of strategic essentialism, a collective identity that emphasizes similarities over differences, may strengthen social movements and magnify political influence in certain circumstances (Rupp and Taylor 1999; Gitlin 1995; Spivak 1996).

However, democratic theorists and activists argue that if emphasizing universality requires repressing difference, it may backfire as a strategy of strengthening solidarity. Normatively, such an approach worsens relations of domination among groups, as the views of the privileged are asserted as universal perspectives that crowd out or silence the marginalized voices (Young 1990; 2000). Indeed, without formal measures to ensure their voices are heard, the issues confronting marginalized groups tend to fall through the cracks of social movement organizations as part of the “tyranny of structurelessness”(Freeman 1972; Strolovitch 2007; Polletta 2004). When members of marginalized groups do not see themselves represented among movement leaders or spokespeople, and when their ideas and concerns repeatedly fail to attract the attention of the broader movement, members of marginalized groups may feel alienated and excluded (Davis 1998). They may exit the organization, rather than continue to exercise voice (Hirschman 1970). On this view, the problem of diversity is a problem of power differentials, and a failure to address them, not a problem of diversity in itself.

Moreover, while deliberation may be central to participatory versions of democracy (Dryzek 2002; Habermas 1989), many scholars have pointed out the pitfalls of deliberative processes aimed at consensus when it comes to diversity: The ideal of face-to-face democracy, of unmediated deliberation, tends to reinforce homogeneity, privileging majority, dominant groups and suppresses dissent (Mansbridge 1983; Young 1990), especially in social movement organizations (Smith and Glidden 2012). If deliberation is to include a broader public, it must be structured to work against these repressive tendencies (Young 2000; Smith and Glidden 2012).

Taking a series of active measures, a sort of affirmative representation (Strolovitch 2007) helps to ensure that diverse participants are included in movements. This includes measures such as descriptive representation, allowing for separate organization of marginalized groups into caucuses, using a “progressive stack” or organizing speaker lists to ensure diversity in order so that dominant groups do not monopolize the discussion, giving additional weight to issues identified by marginalized groups, among others (Strolovitch 2007; Tormos 2017; Weldon 2006). The thread that runs through each of these efforts is that they represent an intentional, purposive approach to countering power in movement deliberations and activities. They actively seek to create a discussion free from domination (Habermas 1989; Smith and Glidden 2012), and indeed, to counter power in all movement activities (not just deliberations), in a communicative democracy approach to movement organizing (Young 2002). This works best when formal rules and principles of inclusivity are articulated, and tends to work less well when informal, personalized forms of connection (such as friendship) are taken to be models for political practice (Polletta 2004; Freeman 1972; Smith and Glidden 2012; for a different view see Rai 2018).

This theoretical approach has implications for our understanding of the likely success of many types and degrees of solidarity, suggesting a focus on two dimensions along which the approach to solidarity can vary: 1) the degree of passivity or agency required or expected of participants in terms of defining the form and goals of coordinated action, in other words, *the degree to which activists are actively engaged in communication, in defining movement goals and discourse*, and 2) the degree to which the process of developing coordinated action takes explicit, formal account of cross-cutting cleavages, or intersectional marginalization, in other words *the recognition or sublimation of difference,* whether movements *intentionally and explicitly* act to counter the distorting effects of power expressed in such differences. We note that the categories we generate here are not offered as an exhaustive typology of approaches to solidarity, but rather as a guide to begin sorting out the ways different responses to diversity – and the relations of group dominance it reflects – affect social movement activities and influence.

*Active solidarity* is the model best supports diversity and inclusion and which will be most associated with long-term persistence and success – at least in the ideal case. Active solidarity is characterized by “thickness” or enduring solidarity that is rooted in group norms and is deliberately crafted, sought-out, and nurtured.[[5]](#footnote-5) But there may be other ways to achieve political impact in the shorter term. Many seasoned activists point to the power of coalitions (e.g., Davis 1998). Perhaps shorter-term actions aimed at common ends can achieve political impact with a less-demanding organizational structure, one that does not involve the development of shared identities or even mutual consultation. We therefore consider the thinnest of such coalitional strategies by way of comparison, one we call *drive-by solidarity*. This approachdescribes a serial strategy employed by some groups to briefly share resources and labor with others before moving on to new campaigns. Such an approach can produce quick, short-term success in some circumstances, but is unlikely to be sustained or develop into a broader social movement.[[6]](#footnote-6)

A third approach*, pop-up solidarity,* isthe product of relatively short-lived “moments” (whether threats or opportunities – see Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978) that bring diverse groups together (but go beyond a single instance of contention)*.* In her article on gender as seriality, Young (1990; 1994) describes the ways that specific politically mobilized groups emerge out of broader contexts in response to changes in specific conditions, as in bread riots or the seemingly spontaneous eruption of outrage at police brutality, corruption in elections, or other injustice. Social groups, defined by social structures, are best understood as a sort of series, a loosely constituted social collective which mostly remains inert, insufficiently prominent as a basis for defined political action in a political circumstance. However, in response to perceived changes or specific events, some portion of this group emerges or erupts into action: A group of people – for example, strangers linked only by their common and regularized reliance on public transit, stranded by a cancelled bus or subway – may coordinate to take a taxi to a common destination. Though such instances of collective action work through extant social networks (e.g., churches, neighborhoods, on-line connections), such eruptions can be powerful, even if short lived, capturing public attention and conveying a kind of authenticity in its seemingly organic emergence. In these cases, the kind of organizational structure that lends itself to deliberation, to intentional measures to empower the marginalized, is unlikely to emerge. The longer these movements endure, the more important it will be for them to develop such measures in order to meet the challenge of diversity.

Lastly, *universal deliberative solidarity* is an elusive form of solidarity, held up as an ideal by many participants in social movements (Smith and Glidden 2012) as well as by political theorists and commentators, based on universal values and deliberative processes without affirmation of group-specific identities. In this view, it is the emphasis of difference itself that creates challenges of diversity for social movements. If diversity is not emphasized, and if common identities or shared values are foregrounded, solidarity will be easier to maintain.

#### Table 1: Types of Solidarity on Two Dimensions: Deliberation & Recognition of Diversity

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Dimension 2: Approach to Diversity**  |
| *Sublimation of diversity and/or tendency toward universalistic talk*  | *Recognition of diversity* |
| **Dimension 1: Degree of Agency deployed** | *Passivity-Not deliberative.*  | Picket-line Solidarity/ Pop-Up Solidarity | Coalition building/ “Drive-by” solidarity |
| *Agency- Deliberation*  | Universal Deliberative Solidarity | Active solidarity |

#### Table 2: Types of Solidarity, Main Characteristics, and Their Expected Effects

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Type of Solidarity* | *Approach to Solidarity* | *Organizational Persistence* | *Political Impact* |
| Active Solidarity | Deliberative, Long-Term, Diversity and Power Explicitly and Intentionally Recognized and Countered | Longer term | Greater impact on public agendas and discourse |
| Drive-by Solidarity | Not-deliberative; Diversity may be recognized in coalitional structure. Movement identities undergirding cooperation remain thin and transitive | Short-term cooperation | Possible indirect impacts through movement transformation as a result of cooperation;Little direct impact on public agendas and discourse |
| Pop-up Solidarity | Not-deliberative; Diversity not foregrounded in movement discourse and strategy; Movement identities undergirding cooperation remain thin and transitory | Short-term cooperation | Possible short-term policy goals achieved. No deeper transformation of public agenda and discourse |
| Universal Deliberation | No group-specific discourse about countering power; Deliberative. | Long-term goals, but not sustainable in the long term | Possible short-term goals achieved. No deeper transformation of public agenda and discourse |

These different models of solidarity are distinguishable from extant notions of solidarity, both practical and theoretical.[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Applying the Framework: The Illustrative Cases**

In what follows, we apply this framework to the study of social movements, investigating the organizational structure and relationships among activists within the same movements and also between movements of the same type. While we see each approach as an “ideal type,” we seek to illustrate them through a series of case studies. For each case, we ask about the way the group responds to challenges of inclusion and exclusion, looking specifically at formal statements and at rules followed. This focus on formal documents and institutionalized practices is important because as Polletta (2004) suggests, democratic rules work best when they are formalized; Informality can lead to exclusion (see also Smith and Glidden 2012; Freeman 1972).

For each case, we ask about whether movements sublimate or foreground diversity (the dimension across the top of Table 1 above) and if they engage members in *passively* solidaristic action (which requires coordination, but not input) or if they are *actively* solidaristic (requiring input and substantive deliberation, not just adoption of already articulated positions or statements) (Dimension on the left of Table 1). We do so by examining the formal approach to diversity in documents such as mission statements and other official movement documents and practices (Table 2 above). In order to get at the presence of deliberation in movements, we also ask about opportunities for activists to express dissent, and how the broader movement or leadership responds to expressions of dissent when they occur. In order to track whether our predictions about movement persistence and political influence are borne out (Table 2), we also consider these aspects of each of our cases. We theorize the links between our independent variables (approach to diversity, dissent) and our dependent variables (persistence, political influence) in each case, to illustrate the value of our theoretical approach. We emphasize that these cases are offered as illustrative cases, as plausibility probes to aid in theory-building, rather than as critical or test cases for our theory.

To study the **approach to difference**, we ask how the movement’s public or official statements define movement values and identities. Do they identify the importance of countering power, or affirm the value of difference? What kinds of identities and values define the movement, delineate its identity? Did activists formally or explicitly identify inclusion and countering power as a priority, or explicitly name specific marginalized groups whose ideas must be given weight or included? Or did activists emphasize a common identity? We also look at the importance of identity in the structure of movement organizations: How did activists organize themselves?

To study the degree of **active or passive** solidarity we examine the movement’s approach to *dissent*. How do activists respond to internal dissent, especially when activists are identified with a marginalized social group? How does this affect their efforts to build their movements and influence policy? We study the new concepts, ideas and tactics that activists use to discuss political issues, and ask whether these new ideas allow new forms of political action and whether these new ideas become influential in the public sphere or policy agenda.

To study movement **persistence** we asked about the longevity of the movement. How long did the movement go on? Was it short-lived (a few months) or long-lasting (more than a year)? Did internal divisions affect the persistence of the movement? If so, how?

To assess political influence we asked whether movement ideas end up in public documents or discussions? Did movements succeed in putting their issues on the political agenda in terms of policy, participation, or both? If applicable, did movements achieve their policy goals? Did diversity among movement participants seem to aid or undermine this influence?

Because a key mechanism by which diversity might strengthen movements is by commanding a **broader constituency** and having more **legitimacy**, we ask whether there is any link between the approach to diversity, or to new ideas that emerge from deliberation, and any broadening of the constituency that might be evident. We also ask whether there is any evidence that having a broader constituency base, or more legitimacy, affected political influence. On the other hand, we also look for evidence that fragmentation and internal; conflict undermined political influence, that is, for evidence that diversity was a liability. *The theoretical literature suggests that diversity will be more of a liability where difference is sublimated and deliberation is minimal. If diversity appears to be more of a liability where movements foreground critical diversity and engage in substantial deliberation, this runs counter to our approach.*

Each of the cases was selected as a useful demonstration of the typology we propose. Our team has relevant primary research experience (interviews, participant observation, or both) with all but one of these cases.

**Occupy Wall Street: Active Solidarity as a Model of Political Influence?**

The Occupy Wall Street Movement began as protesters descended on Zuccotti Park in New York City in 2011, creating an encampment there – an “occupation” of Wall Street – that lasted more than a year. The movement aimed to draw attention to income inequality and the disproportionate influence of the rich, the top 1% in terms of income.

The initial protest was proposed in *AdBusters* magazine, an anti-consumerist magazine published in Vancouver, Canada.[[8]](#footnote-8) The call for occupying Wall Street explicitly took inspiration from Tahrir Square and was endorsed by other movements such as Anonymous and Los Indignados in Spain. The Occupy protesters sought to revitalize democracy and empower ordinary citizens, “the 99%,” and those who stood with them. In under a month, the movement spread from the roughly 1,000 New York City protesters to nearly 1,000 cities in 80 countries.

Occupy embraced a wide array of social justice issues, with economic inequality being the most prominent, and aimed to adopt a radically participatory organizational structure (Gaby and Caren 2016; Flank 2011; Gitlin 2012; Van Gelder 2011). This included, among other things, opposition to hierarchical organizational structures and a preference for seeming leaderlessness (Van Gelder 2011; Gitlin 2012; Smith and Glidden 2012). Occupy’s “Principles of Solidarity” explicitly enunciated a type of solidarity based on recognizing privilege and working against it in all interactions, affirming a *collective* responsibility for activists to work together to overcome oppression. (Working Group on Principles of Consolidation, reproduced in Gelder 2011). Occupy Wall Street in Zuccotti Park operated by forming several working groups. In 2011, there were about 97 working groups, at least 15 of which had 200 or more members. These working groups met regularly (e.g., at least weekly). They included caucuses focused on specific issues as well as more identity-based groups, e.g., the Women of Wall Street (WOWS) and another that was an organization of people of color (Gitlin 2012).

Deliberations were governed by consensus decision-making. This commitment to consensus was explicit from the beginning of the movement,[[9]](#footnote-9) since the movement was as much about participatory democracy as economic inequality or other issues (Gitlin 2012). The OWS deliberations used their own rules for expressing consent and dissent, rules that did not depend on the ability to construct arguments or adopt the language or rhetoric of the dominant group. Merely making the “blocking” sign was adequate to block a proposal. Consent could be indicated by waving the hands in an upright position (“twinkling”); waving with the fingers pointing down was seen as expressing disagreement (Gitlin 2012). The Occupy movement was organized somewhat differently in its many locations, but in at least some of the locations (e.g., Pittsburgh), this consensus model was seen as problematic and exclusionary, alienating women and other marginalized constituencies (Smith and Glidden 2012). The impracticality of the lack of structure made it impossible for those without the luxury of endless time to participate, and the lack of measures to force decisions tended to empower the most intransigent of the interlocutors, making any real progress difficult.

The Zuccotti Park encampment emphasized not only the ideal of deliberation, but also measures to ensure inclusive deliberations. The Occupy movement’s rejection of official leaders did not preclude the emergence of unofficial leaders or “facilitators” (see Gitlin 2012). At Zuccotti Park at least, the movement made specific efforts to promote diverse leadership, for example, ensuring that women and people of color were well represented among those trained as facilitators (Gitlin 2012, 104). Another innovation for ensuring inclusion in movement deliberations was the “progressive stack,” a sort of affirmative action for the discussion list that ensured that women and people of color got an opportunity to speak (Gitlin 2012, 93). The support for marginalized groups through these measures can be seen as a kind of “affirmative representation” (Strolovitch 2005).

Organizationally, the Zuccotti Park encampment eventually developed a “hub and spoke” structure aimed at making movement discussions more organized. Activists created a “spokes” committee to represent the working groups. The job of representing each group rotated among working group members. In spite of the expectation that the Spokes Committee would enable better decision-making for the movement, movement actions were largely blocked by this group: as few as three people could obstruct actions supported by the vast majority of participants. Some participants saw this decision-making model as frustrating and ineffective (Gitlin 2012), a finding that echoes Smith and Glidden’s (2012) observations about Occupy Pittsburgh.

How impactful was the Occupy movement? The many Occupy encampments in the United States were eventually forcefully disbanded by coordinated police action in multiple cities. It is hard to know what might have happened had they not been so dispersed. Some have argued that Occupy had little effect, and attribute this to a lack of clear goals and leaders, though it is true that such criticisms are often levelled at social movements (Engler 2011). Occupy did not focus on a particular policy proposal, instead creating lists of demands and trying to model alternative values. Indeed, specific policy change was never its political goal. Notably, the first *Adbusters* announcement targets the Obama administration, challenging the left to fight for progressive values. It says nothing about specific policies.

A major way that social movements have political influence is by changing the agenda, language, framing, and terms of debate (Gaby and Caren 2016; Engler 2011; Rochon and Mazmanian 1993; Weldon 2011). Gaby and Caren (2016) find that Occupy increased media attention to income inequality, and that this effect persisted beyond the movement itself. Discussions of economic inequality have become more mainstream in American politics since the Occupy movement, with phrases like “the 1%” and the “99%” becoming widely used.

Movements may also have *indirect* influence by mobilizing networks of people to political action. The activist networks created by Occupy may have sown the seeds of the Black Lives Matter movement, the Women’s March and other movements aimed at progressive ends in the years following Occupy. Whether or not these indirect effects were observed, this discussion suggests that Occupy has had at least some lasting political influence, but was not persistent, as it lasted only a little more than a year. Was this influence because of – or in spite of – its organizational structure? Comparison with other cases is needed to answer this question.

In sum, then, Occupy Wall Street adopted an active stance in terms of engaging participants in deliberation. The approach to diversity seems to have varied somewhat across the encampments, with some (like Zuccotti Park) coming closer to an ideal of foregrounding diversity than others. The deliberative ethic and commitment to consensus seems to have empowered obstructionists and hindered action. Regardless of how frustrating movement deliberations proved to be, there is evidence of impact on public discourse and policy discussions. It is unclear whether this impact was related to a broader legitimacy, though many newspaper stories did reference the diversity and breadth of protesters, pointing out their cross-class and multi-age composition. Racial and gender divisions did crop up, and might have become more prominent had the movement not been disbanded by the police.

**Anonymous and BlackLivesMatter: Drive-by Solidarity and Fleeting Political Alliances**

Our remaining cases point to other distinct forms of solidarity. Sometimes, solidarity can arise unexpectedly from an outside group that temporarily joins another in an existing conflict, which we conceptualize as “drive-by” solidarity. While this may result in a fleeting coalition of sorts, it is not coordinated between the two parties, and may even be unwelcome. It can be highly effective in achieving certain short-term goals, especially in bringing wide-spread attention to an issue; however, the long-term impacts are dubious. As a case in point, we present an examination of a campaign from the online hacktivist collective Anonymous to illustrate their drive-by solidarity with the BlackLivesMatter (BLM) movement.

In November 2014, as BLM protesters in Ferguson, Missouri, marched and rioted over the police shooting of Michael Brown, a subgroup of the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan (KKK) called the Traditionalist American Knights distributed fliers around Ferguson claiming that they would use “lethal force” against the protesters as a form of “self-defense.” In an unexpected response, Anonymous posted a video online declaring cyberwar on the KKK. The campaign, called “Operation KKK” (#OpKKK), aimed to “de-hood” KKK members by hacking into their websites and social media profiles and publicly revealing their true identities, a tactic known as “doxxing.”

The videostated that the KKK “has been interfering with Anonymous,” and was targeted because of their “threats to use lethal attacks against us at the Ferguson protests”(AnonymousTV1, 2014). This implies that Anonymous actors, or Anons for short, were already among the Ferguson protesters, and viewed BLM as part of the same “us.” The video expresses further solidarity with BLM through statement such as, “[Y]ou messed with our family, now we will mess with yours.” Anons proceeded to take control of KKK websites and social media to reveal the identities of numerous members, including in the Ferguson Police Department. But the video message stops short of fully endorsing the goals of BLM, stating, “[W]e are not attacking you [the KKK] for what you believe in, as we fight for freedom of speech.” It appears that the solidarity Anonymous expressed towards BLM was actually limited and one-sided.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Nonetheless, precisely one year later, an Anonymous subgroup called “Ghost Squad” revived #OpKKK once again, this time revealing identities of more than 350 alleged KKK members (Woolf 2015). This was followed, in April 2016, by a cyberattack against a major KKK website which disabled the site for several days (Faife 2016). Soon after, though, the same subgroup launched cyberattacks against the main BLM website (Faife 2016). A Twitter user claimed responsibility, writing, “I, se1ge, started this operation after attacking the KKK [because] I realized the individuals in the Black Lives Matter movement were acting no better – some even promote genocide of the Caucasian race…This will not be tolerated. What angered me and the other members of Ghost Squad was that the leaders also do not speak on this topic. This was not the dream of Martin Luther King Jr, and should not be supported or promoted by any movement. All Lives Matter!”

From this case, we can begin to see the dynamics of drive-by solidarity. Anonymous initially revealed itself as an ally of BLM by expressing solidarity during the 2014 Ferguson protests. They acted in defense of BLM protesters by going to cyberwar with the KKK for more than two years. The effects of #OpKKK are notable for bringing media attention to the Klan’s threats, and leading many members to reportedly quit the Klan for fear of damage to their reputations or physical harm (AnonCopWatch 2015). Anonymous helped provide a protective buffer for BLM from the KKK at a time when BLM was still somewhat unorganized and working to establish its credibility as a movement. Helpful though this may have been, there is no evidence that BLM and Anonymous actively collaborated in any way. The two movements did not deliberate or work together to build lasting ties of trust and solidarity. Ultimately, the alliance broke down and Ghost Squad turned against BLM.

Anonymous did not seek to build an active coalition or include the marginalized voices of BLM actors in its decision-making, which created shaky ground on which to build an alliance. This lack of inclusive deliberation seems to be true even within its own movement. As Coleman described, “I could imagine hypothetically that a lot of people who use the Ghost Squad mantle might not be for [attacking BLM] but also might not be against it enough to speak out. You don’t know whether they all actively support it or just tolerate it” (Faife 2016). Indeed, on July 15, 2016, several other Anonymous subgroups declared “a day of action in solidarity” with the BLM movement (Lynch et al*.* 2016). The anonymous and leaderless nature of Anonymous (Coleman 2015) makes active solidarity virtually impossible, and long-term alliances with other movements extremely volatile. Thus, the collective appears only able to express solidarity with others in brief, spontaneous “drive-by” moments. Such solidarity may be highly effective in the short-term, but unpredictable and possibly even counterproductive in the long-term.

In its effort to ally itself with BLM, Anonymous, then, is neither actively deliberative, nor oriented towards amplifying the voices and presence of marginalized groups within the movement, or within deliberations aimed at creating solidarity. The solidarity action may have been impactful in the short-term - defending BLM activists against the Klan at a vulnerable moment, possibly forcing the Klan to back off as the Traditionalist American Knights suffered a sudden decline in membership. But this solidarity was sporadic and unsteady, with Anonymous even seeming to turn on BLM at times, and then to re-engage in solidaristic activity. Whatever the short-term impact of this action, longer-term, broader impacts (of the kind Occupy manifested above) seem less likely. As a response to challenges to diversity within the movement, this kind of sporadic, short-term action seems best suited to short-term, specific goals. It may not be as effective as efforts to build coalitions and lasting relationships, and may actually obstruct such coalitions in the long term if the trustworthiness or reliability of solidaristic partners is undermined.

**The Sunflower Movement: Pop-Up Solidarity and Limited Goals for Political Success**

The Sunflower Movement in Taiwan illustrates a third type of solidarity, one that is narrow in its goals, and short-lived in its activities, but also very effective in achieving its goals. In this case, a group of protesting students were able to change the outcome of a trade agreement – a case of a movement altering political action in an area often considered “high politics” in which only the most economically and politically powerful play a role. How did this happen? And what form of solidarity produced this remarkable outcome?

On March 18, 2014, activists and students from universities in Taiwan stormed the Assembly Hall of Taiwan’s legislature and occupied it for 23 days. Their protest, later dubbed the Sunflower Movement, aimed to delay the Taiwanese government’s entering into a trade agreement with China because of a lack of transparency and perceived procedural improprieties in the negotiation of the agreement. The movement ended after successfully, and indefinitely, postponing the verification process. The movement is also credited with stimulating the formation of a new political party, the New Power Party, that won several legislative seats in the 2016 general election, and galvanizing the younger generation to be more active in politics.

The Sunflower movement began in an unplanned and somewhat spontaneous manner. On March 18, 2014, student and members of several civic organizations gathered in front of the legislature to speak out against the unilateral decision by the ruling-party, Kuomintang, to pass the trade pact without a clause-by-clause review process as previously agreed upon between major parties. Enraged, some student leaders and activists started climbing over the walls, entering the legislature. Word of this impromptu action spread through social media, such as Facebook, and within hours, hundreds of students, activists, and civilians assembled outside the legislature to support the occupation. Initially, many people voluntarily entered the legislature. Participants united to “stop government injustice,” a new goal with broad, fresh appeal. As one of the interviewees noted, “The framing of the movement was strategic; the call to ‘stop government injustice’ was broader than the goal of any movement before, such as ending media monopoly, so it could attract so many people in such a short time.”

Inside the legislative hall, participants fended off attempts by the police to eject them by blocking the main doors with barricades. Activists were coordinating their action at this stage in an ad-hoc manner. The brevity and sudden onset of the occupation precluded the formation of any formal organization for decision-making. Participants had frequent conversations with one another, sharing their experiences and tips to counter police attack. Looking back, interviewees characterized this phase as the most open and engaging part of the movement.

Multiple police attempts failed to eject the protestors, and food and water trickled in. As the protesters seemed set to remain in the hall, they developed formal decision-making process, forming a committee of nine that included student leaders, their advisors, and NGO representatives. Interviewees reported that this committee wielded influence because their previous movement experience -and the network they formed through it -gave them “authority and legitimacy” over other participants. The activists and media started calling the protest the Sunflower Movement after a florist sent in hundreds of sunflowers to represent the value the movement was fighting for— transparency in government.[[11]](#footnote-11) The Sunflower movement is viewed as a student movement because top leaders and most participants were students. This association with students likely inspired greater public sympathy and support.

The committee regularly held a joint discussion, which included representatives of civic groups as well as representatives of functional groups inside the legislature, such as those providing interpretation, legal, medical, and logistic functions. Well-connected activists were more likely to receive an invitation to the conference, which could include thirty to forty participants and take hours to make decisions. Disagreements were resolved by decisions among leaders. Decision-making in this movement was thus deliberative to some degree.

For those excluded from the joint discussion, the opportunities for effective participation in movement decision-making were slim, and at best, sporadic. When asked about opportunities for participants to voice opinions, one interviewee noted: “Chen and Lin [the student leaders] walked around a lot in the hall, so you (a protestor) could just walk up to them to tell them what you think, but I do not know if they will adopt your opinion.” At the later stage of the movement, the committee encouraged participants inside the hall to write suggestions on note cards. However, “nobody really reads them. There is a giant pile in one corner,” noted one interviewee.

Participants occupying the street outside the legislature were even less likely to be able to participate in movement decisions. Activists may have participated in their own occasional discussion groups but these had no connection to the decisions being made inside the legislative hall. Some minority participants, for example, students from universities in Southern Taiwan, received verbal appreciation but no invitations to joint conferences. The public statements throughout the movement made by the decision-making body had few references to inclusion and diversity.

Interviewees with few social or organizational connections to those participating in the joint conferences expressed disappointment in the lack of opportunities for meaningful participation, which led to their departure from the movement. As one interviewee noted, “I do not know anyone. I do not attend the same university as the organizers, so I cannot participate in meetings. Sometimes I feel bored so I stopped going anymore.” In fact, the committee’s decision to end the movement was met by anger outside the hall. “People were upset because they worked so hard for several weeks, but had almost no voice in the movement,” one of the interviewees commented. While some interviewees defended the top-down leadership style as the result of the urgency of the movement, they still considered it as an area for improvement.

Power differences led to miscommunication between activists inside and outside the legislature and sometimes within the Committee. It created distrust and contempt among participants and led to intense disagreement and division. At one point, several activists broke off and mounted an attack on another government building. The attack we easily repelled by the police, but also inspired greater support for the main movement. Later, about two weeks after the beginning of the movement, another group of protestors left the hall to establish a “low life liberation zone” to protest against the elitist decision-making style. This group took this name as a criticism of the movement, to point out that it made them feel like “low-life” due to the lack of opportunities to have their voices heard. Public forums in the low-life liberation zone allowed participants to discuss any issue and decisions were made based on the majority rules. The public discussion forum served as a way for many to vent their anger and disappointment about the lack of participation in movement decision-making, but it is unclear whether perspectives from the forum had any influence on decisions made by the main committee.

The Sunflower Movement, then, is a sort of pop-up solidarity: a short-term, narrowly focused movement that did little to address internal power relations and relied on situational and existing identities and narratives to define the movement. The impending threat of a trade bill verification triggered the movement. The goal of stopping the verification created an umbrella that brought together previously uncoordinated participants. Contrary to our expectation, this pop-up solidarity movement was successful in that it postponed the verification process indefinitely, and created substantial change to Taiwan’s politics. It had tremendous political influence, clearly articulated goals, and appears to have achieved those goals. In 2014, the Taiwanese public was unsatisfied with the party in power, and the movement may have capitalized upon this wave of dissatisfaction to deliver the political change citizens desired. Regardless, in formal terms, the movement appeared to advance identifiable policy and political goals.

This movement emphasized the student-movement identity and emphasized shared democratic values (transparency, opposition to injustice), but did not adopt a deliberative style or recognize diversity. As such, it represents the upper left quadrant in our typology, with low levels of deliberation, and a lack of attention to diversity and power. Even in its short life, however, these exclusionary tactics appeared to be causing problems for the movement. The short-lived nature of the political struggle may be the reason these issues did not prevent success. Alternatively, political success may be the reason the movement was short-lived. This case study shows that pop-up solidarity proved an effective method of channeling popular dissent and creating a short-lived but powerful movement for political change.

**Socialist International: Universalist but not Deliberative or Diverse?**

Our last case, the Socialist International may be a rough approximation of the universal, deliberative model of solidarity. Formally in existence since 1951, the idea of the Socialist International began as part of the trade union movement. Among the forerunners for the organization are the international organizations that claimed to be the expression of the international solidarity of the union movements: The International Workingmen’s Association and the Labor International, both of which were active before the First World War. After the tumult of the Second World War, these groups were ultimately reconstituted as the Socialist International. Today, the Socialist International is more a coalition or voluntary organization of political parties (socialist and progressive parties) than an organization of trade unions, but it still seeks to function as the international expression of the trade union movement. Many socialist and progressive parties see themselves as part of, or linked to, the labor movement, so this organization, in as much as it is “non-governmental” with respect to the international arena, can be seen as a voluntary transnational organization in that sense. The organization is based on shared ideas and values, the vision of bringing about a socialist society and world. In addition, some members are part of a government and some are not. Although this example blurs the line somewhat between political parties and social movements, it may offer some insight into our questions. Indeed, some have called for more research into political party formation as a tactic of social movements (Cowell-Meyers 2014).

Trade unions and political parties had fairly close relations, at least in Europe, until the 1970s. Around that time, the Socialist International had become a place where Social Democratic Parties and their Leaders met, coordinated policies and political strategy. The organization was not much of an independent international actor and there were some who wanted to change this. German socialist Willy Brandt became leader of the organization in 1972 (and remained until 1992), and began to reach out to try to revitalize the organization and strengthen the ties beyond Europe (Väänänen 2014). Some critics in the international socialist movement saw this broadening as ultimately undermining the Socialist International:

Under the presidency of Willy Brandt (1976-1992) the SI tried to become less euro-centric and to open up to the world. Its membership increased rapidly. Unfortunately, many of these new members had a very distant relationship to socialism in any recognizable form: they included, for example, the governing parties of Mexico and India, deeply corrupt and authoritarian, and worse: the government parties of Tunisia and Egypt, instruments of personal or military dictatorships. (Pantland 2014).

Today, the Socialist International is still in existence, and has members (meaning political parties that are members) in 100 countries from every region of the world. Some 150 parties belong to the organization (Socialist International 2016). This means this organization is fairly long lasting. One would think that through its connections to actual political parties, this organization would also be fairly influential. Is it? It is hard to tell. The organization participated in COP21 in Paris, by its own account, and seems to attract some negative press from the right in the United States. Apart from that coverage, the only current commentary on this organization in the public domain suggests that the SI is involved in a “slow death” or is in decline and irrelevant. The lack of commentary itself, even among supporters, does seem to suggest that, at the very least, this is not an organization that is playing a vibrant public role on the international scene today.

In terms of organizational philosophy and approach, the socialist international is certainly universalist. Its Declaration of Principles argues that “It is the people of the world who should exercise control by means of a more advanced democracy in all aspects of life: political, social, and economic. Political democracy, for socialists, is the necessary framework and precondition for other rights and liberties” (Socialist International 1989). Further, “All the peoples of the world should be involved in the process of transforming our societies and promoting new hope for humankind. The Socialist International calls on all men and women committed to peace and progress to work together in order to translate this hope into reality.” The idea of solidarity that undergirds the SI’s activities builds on this universalist approach:

Solidarity is all-encompassing and global. It is the practical expression of common humanity and of the sense of compassion with the victims of injustice. Solidarity is rightly stressed and celebrated by all major humanist traditions. In the present era of unprecedented interdependence between individuals and nations, solidarity gains an enhanced significance since it is imperative for human survival.

The organization has several working groups, thematic committees and commissions focused on regions or on specific issues (climate change, democracy, migration). One group focuses on “Equality” and one on “Inequality.” There are no official identity-specific working groups, commissions, or caucuses. There is a group of socialist international women, which consists of the women’s sections of all the socialist parties that are members, but this is a parallel group, rather than a part of the organization itself (Socialist International Women 2016). The strongest official statements on inequality make little reference to distinct groups or differences (apart from cultural or national differences). Most discussions of gender or race inequality are quite abstract. For example, a recent special session produced the following statement:

On the theme of equality, a broad range of views was heard advocating equality in many forms – both between the richest and poorest within societies, between developed and developing countries, and between different genders and social groups. Delegates outlined the challenges faced in ensuring that the benefits of development reach all sectors of the population, as well as the importance of the role that social democracy would have to play in this process. The diverse contributions during the debate underlined the important work that will be undertaken by the SI Commission on Equality, which will meet during 2016 to define approaches and priorities of the social­democratic movement in the struggle to eliminate inequality in the global economy (Socialist International 2015).

The report from the Commission on inequality mentioned, here, however, makes no reference to gender, race or ethnicity (Socialist International 2016). It focuses explicitly on issues and policies relating to class inequality.

The organization is fairly homogenous, and not diverse at all in terms of gender. Pictures on the website, lists of representations, and narratives of members underline the male-dominated nature of the meetings and leadership.[[12]](#footnote-12) The organization has never had a woman at the helm, as President or Secretary General, and few women are pictured in the many images of events on the webpage. A report from 1998 urges equal representation of women and men in parties and committees, and suggests that gender equality will necessitate the restructuring of society. The main concrete action that is recommended, however, is that “Women elected to office should act on their commitment by addressing the social, economic and cultural barriers facing most women” (Socialist International 1998). Another document mentioning gender equality mentions only child care and legalizing reproductive rights.

In terms of deliberation, officers are elected at periodic Congresses, but there are no measures to ensure that marginalized groups are present or that they are able to speak. Indeed, the few commentaries about the organization in the public domain point to a lack of transparency and a lack of commitment to principles of socialism and democracy.

In short, this organization is not very diverse in gender terms, and has little of the way of substantive representation of women’s interests as articulated by socialist women elsewhere. This organization seems to have persisted over a very long time, and has a broad global reach. Still, the organization is not as influential as one would expect given its direct ties to political parties, global reach and persistence.

**Comparisons and Theoretical Reflections**

Each of these cases is in some ways an imperfect instantiation of our conceptual categories. The models of solidarity we propose here constitute sort of “ideal types,” based on our theoretical arguments, that will appear as a matter of degree in practice. This makes drawing conclusions about our arguments more complex, but these cases do allow us to refine and reinforce the theoretical arguments advanced at the outset.

First, Occupy seems to exemplify our idea of Active Solidarity in many respects, especially the emphasis on deliberation and participation, building of thick relationships of trust aimed at long-term coordination and community building, and at least in the case of Zuccotti Park, some efforts to ensure the participation of marginalized groups on an equal footing. However, Occupy may fall short of our ideal of active solidarity by emphasizing deliberation, consensus and participation more than the affirmation of difference, though there is certainly some evidence of affirmative representation, at least at the Zuccotti Park encampment. It does seem that Polletta’s (2004) concern about participatory but informal and leaderless processes has some purchase on the Occupy protests, as others have observed (Smith and Glidden 2012). Beyond this, though, our case suggests that even somewhat dysfunctional protests can have significant political impact. If formal measures were taken to empower marginalized groups and enable more effective decision-making, such movements could be even more powerful (see also Kohn 2013). Other movements may strike the balance between deliberative, consensual decision-making and the representation of marginalized groups quite differently.

We also illustrated that shorter-term forms of solidarity, such as Drive-by solidarity and Pop-up solidarity, may be effective in the short-term, but less sustainable in the longer term. The demands of long-term coordination require more shared values and visions. The limited nature of the political goals of the movements illustrating these types, and the relatively short timeframe, though, were important for success. Neither of these forms would be likely to succeed in the long term. On the other hand, the abbreviated nature of the response also makes the more demanding forms of active solidarity completely unrealistic. The question for these short-term solidarity projects may center on how to maximize short-term effectiveness without precluding longer term coordination by undermining trust or creating lasting conflict.

Finally, the Socialist International demonstrates that some ideas – like the ideal of universal deliberation – have global, long-lasting appeal. However, the case also illustrates the disconnect between visions of universal deliberation, and its ideal of seamless, informal inclusion, and its practice. It also shows the difficulty of translating abstract universalistic solidarity into political influence. A group that shared ideas, ideology and identity, and that had concrete avenues to political influence, has lost all liveliness and energy, if it was ever animated by such fervor.

The power of short-term actions involving less organizational commitment suggests further consideration of how to strike the balance between building trust and relationships that can sustain longer term cooperation, and making movement work practicable and inclusive, rather than torturous and exclusive. Active solidarity need not necessarily involve the intensive community-building strategy of Occupy. Other movements have been politically influential without the intense encampment tactic and open-ended relationship building associated with these movements. Moreover, adopting a more variegated set of tactics may allow for greater persistence and success over the long term. In the case of Occupy, one has to wonder if persistence is limited by the intense commitment required by the form of protest, i.e., encampment and modeling of democratic community, and the vulnerability of such tactics to repression.

More generally, our cases point to the role of repression, both in creating solidarity and in mediating the effects of solidarity on movement outcomes. In spite of recent advances in the study of repression (Aytac et al 2017; Davenport et al. 2005; Davenport 2007), the complex effects of repression on social movements remain poorly understood. Repression can unite diverse constituents against a common enemy, contributing to mobilizing emotions and a shared sense of “we-ness” (Hirsch 1990); however, it can also increase the costs of collective action and therefore stymie protest (Tilly 1978). We suggest that a careful examination of the type of solidarity, and its effects, can help elucidate the effects of repression on mobilization.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we have developed a novel framework for the analysis of solidarity in order to systematize the ways that social movements engage diversity, and how the approach to diversity affects social movement longevity and success. We offer four cases to illustrate the degree of success associated with various approaches to diversity. We conclude that solidarity is more than the stuff of songs, chants, and hashtags. We argue that the powerful feelings of togetherness that inspire such cultural forms are not simply descriptive of collective action, but also have implications for activists’ abilities to persist in their efforts and, possibly, to achieve their protest goals. Moreover, different types of solidarity – characterized by the dimensions of deliberation and recognition of diversity – can lead to different outcomes. These conclusions may be tentative and mainly theoretically-based, but these cases illustrate the plausibility of the approach we outline and the promise of future work aimed at testing and refining these ideas. We encourage further research to develop and test the relationship between deliberation and solidarity, diversity and solidarity, and solidarity, persistence, and outcomes more systematically with a larger sample of cases, as well as with other data.

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1. Authors consist of the Purdue Diversity and Inclusion in Social Movements Research Collaborative (Tormos is now at University of Missouri-St. Louis). Authors listed here in reverse alphabetical order. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Scholars have examined other types of organizational innovations (e.g., Ferree and Martin 1995; Polletta 2004) with respect to a variety of outcomes, but no one has systematized movement approaches to diversity as such and examined the outcomes of these approaches. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Of course there is an argument for that approach as well (Page, 2008), though even that research emphasizes the importance of inclusion to realizing the benefits of diversity. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. While solidaristic action must be intentional, we do not build into the definition the specific value or goal that is the motivation for solidarity since that is being investigated in this project. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. This model is closest to Hancock’s solidarity politics but is more collective than individual in terms of strategy. See also Raman (2010); Dean (1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This can be thought of as a kind of coalitional strategy that has no long term aspirations. Coalitions are a central mechanism offered as a way of addressing intersectional divisions. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For examples of extant concepts see transversal solidarity (Raman 2010); intersectional solidartity (Hancock 2011); intersectional praxis (Townsend Bell 2011), among others. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For a timeline and archived set of AdBuster posts related to Occupy see https://www.adbusters.org/occupywallstreet/ [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See for example, “First Communique: We Occupy Wall Street” Posted Sept 19 2011 8:48 EST by Occupy Wall Street, reproduced in Flank, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. For discussion of Anonymous as a sort of global actor, or “e-bandit” see Wong and Brown 2013. Though there is not space to discuss it here, such e-banditry could represent a kind of contentious politics. In this paper, we focus on whether Anonymous’ actions with respect to BlackLivesMatter can be seen as solidaristic, which could be consistent with this view. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Past social movements in Taiwan adopted names of flowers, such as the Wild Lily movement in the 1990s and the Wild Strawberry Movement in 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See *The Rose and The Fist*; See also http://www.socialistinternational.org/images/ [↑](#footnote-ref-12)