Inclusive Deliberation, Diversity and Solidarity in Transnational Social Movements
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Introduction

In 2007, more than 66,000 participants from 110 countries came together in Nairobi, Kenya to participate in the World Social Forum, organized as an alternative to the World Economic Forum, aimed at illustrating that "another world is possible." (World Social Forum, 2001; Frank 2007; Moghadam 2009). This was only one of an ongoing series of global meetings of activists seeking to advance social justice and contest globalization, first held in Brazil in 2002 and planned to continue in Montreal in 2016.[1] These global fora attract a wide range of people from a variety of walks of life and national origins, displaying diversity in gender, race, ethnicity, class and a host of other social dimensions (Frank 2007; Moghadam 2009).[2]

Interestingly, this is not the only such grouping of activists emerging to seek social justice. People have been coordinating cross-national action in search of social justice on issues such as violence against women, reproductive rights, and LGBTQ rights. Thousands join together in sustained and coordinated confrontation with specific states, corporations and international organizations to protest sweatshops, human rights violations and other injustices. How is it possible that these activists from so many different backgrounds are able to voluntarily coordinate their action?

Although some scholars have argued that diversity should be seen as a political resource (e.g. Young 1990), for most scholars, greater diversity is not seen as something that improves social movement success or strengthens political participation. Political scientists tend to focus on the role of resources and extant identities (conceived in fixed terms) to explain political mobilization more generally. For example, when we analyze political mobilization in elections, we treat gender-class-race groups as atomized segments of the population that behave in similar, predictable ways. We see educational level and religion as determining political action.[3] Political scientists who study social movements point to the empowering role of organizations and institutions, and other connective ties, but diversity itself is rarely seen as a strength (Meyer et al 2005; Tarrow 1998; Staggenborg 2011; for exceptions see Tilly 1978; Weldon 2006). For most social movement scholars, increasing diversity and multiple identities among adherents, such as race, ethnicity, nationality, and North-South divisions, is seen as a significant challenge to overcome (Gitlin 1995; Snow and McAdam 2000; Echols, 1989; Beckwith, 2000). And presenting a united front is generally seen as an important challenge, and element for success, for both national and transnational movements (Smith 2008; Gitlin 1995). How

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[1] For example, Della Porta reports that 50,000 demonstrators representing 1,387 groups from a wide range of countries took part in the Battle of Seattle (the first of these globally-oriented protests) including trade unions, environmentalists, and religious organizations, among others. At its height, more than 15,000 groups, were gathered [2] There has been a debate about criticisms relating to the representativeness of the World Social Forum 2012) There is not space to engage those here.

[3] For an excellent review and critique of the literature on political mobilization see Hahrie Han *Moved to Action*.

do these transnational activists overcome these challenges to build these organizations in the first place? And why do others fail?

In this paper, we argue that the key to building a powerful and lasting movement, and approach that maximizes organizations ability to use diversity as a political resource, is inclusive deliberation. Inclusive deliberation requires the development of specific norms of decision-making that work to diminish the role of power and domination in discussion, and that empower the marginalized in their efforts to articulate and communicate about their perspectives and concerns.

Increasing Transnationality and Transnational Social Movements

The claims of increasing capital trade flows and the internationalization of financial capital markets has inspired many discussions of globalization and its impact (Stiglitz 2003; Thurow 2000; Keohane and Milner 1996).[4] Others have focused on the social dimensions of globalization, examining whether the development of transnational social ties has thickened or sped up in recent years (Thurow 2000; Castells 2012). The development of global civil society has presented activists with new opportunities to influence national and transnational actors (Smith 2008; but see Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998). Technological developments making it easy and relatively costless (at least for those with access to a computer or cell phone) to connect with others in far flung national locations have sped up the response of human rights activists to violations, as they use global networks to mobilize opposition. Similarly, ideas and tactics, such as the sit-in or occupying tactic, can diffuse internationally more easily, with activists in places like New York or London citing activists in Egypt as their inspiration for occupying public spaces. Indeed, many claim that social and economic ties are increasing around the world, and certainly, it seems that international networks of activism have never been more salient (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Moghadam 2009). Whether this is because of a crisis (push) or a pull or enabling role of technology, is difficult to say, but it does seem that voluntary coordinated action across borders is exploding (Castells 2012; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). For example, the number of global organizations (including both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)) more than doubled from 1981 to1997 (Deutscher Bundestag in Della Porta et al 2006 p.14).

Many scholars have studied social movements, examining activists' tactics for building solidarity and influencing public opinion and affairs. A few have examined questions about how activists build solidarity cross-nationally, and this number is growing. However, this literature is still nascent, focused more on establishing whether transnational social movements exist, how they might be defined, and what distinct kinds of transnational mobilization can be identified (For examples see Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Della Porta et al 2006; Smith and Bandy 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998). These foundational works are necessary, to be sure. But the phenomenon of transnational mobilization deserves more explanation: Why do activists seek to build these transnational ties, given that their natural targets, most often, would be national

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[4] For a debate see the first issue of the *Review of Political Economy* (Vol 1; 1, 1994).

governments? Even more puzzling, how do they formulate claims that command voluntary adherence from so many different countries, and a broad range of constituencies? Why and how do they build solidarity transnationally, and what is the secret to the most persistent and influential movements?

We can define transnational social movements as the voluntary coordination of activities and people from more than one country in pursuit of common ends (cf. Della Porta et al 2006,18).[5] These groups must be "engaged in sustained contentious action with power holders in at least one state not their own," or engaged in challenging international institutions or multinational economic actors (Tarrow 2001). How do these movements build the solidarity that is so important for their success? This is a challenge for any social movement, but ought to be especially difficult for transnational movements, which on top of the usual social divisions of race, gender, and class add nationality, north-south divisions, divisions of colonizers and former colonies, and the challenges of connecting across widely varying local contexts. These challenges are not just challenges of difference; they are challenges of power and domination. How do transnational movements manage to overcome these challenges and successfully organize?

Group Domination and Mistrust

A central challenge for transnational activists seeking to establish voluntary connections across borders is power. Power corrupts deliberation in insidious ways. Privilege is often invisible to the privileged; Marginalized groups often lack the space, opportunity or even the language needed to articulate their distinctive views and concerns. Conflicts of interest worsen these problems, as it is not in the interest of privileged groups to discern their privilege (McIntosh 1988; Williams 1998; Young 2000; Mansbridge 1999).

One problem centers on the subtle and not-so-subtle ways that the standard ways of doing things excludes members of marginalized groups. Their traditional ways of speaking or greeting may be viewed with scorn or seen as inappropriate (Young 2002). The very patterns of speech associated may be associated with stupidity or inarticulateness in the dominant culture, and members of marginalized groups may be interrupted more, and perceived as talking too much, taking more than their share of time, when they actually speak only as much or even less than their privileged counterparts. Ideas advanced by marginalized groups may be ignored or credited to other, more privileged members of the group. Work and accomplishments attributed to members of marginalized gender or racial groups may diminished merely by the attribution to them, the association with their body and group identity (Beirnat and Manis 1994; Beirnat and Kobrynowski 1997; Beirnat 2012). Indeed, bias against the marginalized may be so ingrained in the language that it is unclear whether the "subaltern" can speak at all (Spivak 1988).

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[5] O'Brien et al (2000) define a global social movement as "groups of people around the world working on the transworld plane pursuing far reaching social change" (13; see also 12-16).

The world is set up for the privileged, organized around their preferences and patterns of life. Privileged groups are so used to this accommodation that it is invisible to them. They may fail to see the ways that schedules and buildings and language is organized to reflect their ways of life. They fail to see the way they take up more space than is proportionate to their numbers; It is painfully obvious, however, to the person in the wheelchair at the foot of the set of stairs, to the non-English speaking person trying to negotiate the United States, to the working class person seeking access to higher education, that the world is not set up for them (McIntosh 1988).

Apart from blindness to privilege and the difficulty of articulating the perspective of a group that is dominated and whose views are organized of the agenda, it is not in the interest of the privileged to see or articulate these issues, even if they did see them (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998). No one wishes to acknowledge the ways that the playing field is tilted to their advantage, as it diminishes their accomplishments, making them seem less deserved. Such conflicts of interest are easily visible from the perspective of marginalized groups however (Hartsock 1983). Conflicts of interest, then, come to be reflected in different points of view, standpoints, or perspectives (Young 2000; Hartsock 1983; Harding 2004; Weldon 2011).

These conflicts of interest create mistrust that contributes to division (Williams 1998) and problems in building solidarity. The issues that are important to the marginalized fail to make it onto the agenda of broader organizations (Strolovitch 2008; Weldon 2002; 2006). This may lead to alienation from the broader movement, creating fragmentation that weakens the movement (Davis 1998).

Complicating the matter, relations between groups do not map evenly onto specific bodies (Moi 1999; Hawkesworth 2013). There is nearly always some respect in which a given individual is privileged, and nearly always some other respects in which they are disadvantaged (Lugones 1994). Nor can these axes be neatly added up, multiplied, or subtracted. Rather, they intersect in ways that complicate the articulation of group perspectives for even the most clearly oppressed or marginalized group (Hancock 2007).

Solutions: Building Solidarity

How can activists overcome this mistrust and these relations of domination to build political solidarity in the context of diversity? Here we consider the role of common identities, interests and perspectives in fostering coordinated action.

Identity

Some scholars argue that affirming differences creates problems for political solidarity (Miller 1994; Schlesinger 1992) and that a return to universalism, a strategy of emphasizing commonalities rather than differences, is the way to re-invigorate progressive social movements and regain policy influence (Gitlin, 1995). Other social movement scholars contend that whatever the reality, the *perception* of a common identity is critical to successful mobilization: Even essentialist identities that deny real

differences can strengthen movements (Rupp and Taylor, 1999). And some political philosophers have argued that progressive or liberal politics require that we establish a broader identity group that includes everyone, a wider sense of "we" that ultimately includes everyone (Rorty 1989). Experimental work seems to cement the connection between a superordinate identity, such as a unifying national identity, and political mobilization and civic involvement (Huddy and Khatib 2007; Transue 2007). In his wildly successful 2008 Campaign, President Obama seemed to appeal to voters to overcome partisan and racial divisions and to affirm their identity as "Americans." International feminists have sometimes emphasized essentialist gender identities as a way of fostering solidarity, and this tactic has had some success in spite of the glaring differences among women (Rupp and Taylor 1999).

Other evidence, such as survey evidence and evidence from social movements, however, points to a more nuanced story (Citrin, Wong and Duff 2001). In at least some contexts, it seems that activists are able to overcome such divisions without denying politically salient conflicts and differences (Weldon 2006). The solidarity manifest in transnational social movements is particularly impressive: In addition to organizing across class, ethnic and racial divisions, these activists come together across borders, even oceans, to argue for water rights, the right to shelter, for LGBTQ rights, and many other important political goals.[6]

Moreover, there are costs to false assertions of universality. Some participants, or potential participants in the movement, may not see themselves as adequately represented in these universalistic messages. They may become alienated from the movement, or choose not to participate in the first place (Davis 1998). When interests and identities are, in fact, not shared, it is hard to see how affirming these issues and concerns that are not of concern to all constituencies will intensify or broader support.

Perhaps a greater concern is one of justice: Those whose concerns are most likely to slip through the cracks are the most marginalized, while more privileged groups are more likely to have their concerns represented as universal ones (Strolovitch 2008). Such movements, aiming to be forces for justice, are excluding the most vulnerable in their ranks and working disproportionately to assist the most privileged in their ranks. This is unlikely to sit well with most activists, oriented as they are towards justice and equality. The power of social movements comes from the force of their moral claims. To the extent that they are making claims for inclusion, their own exclusions undermine their arguments and claims, and weaken them.

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[6] Other examples include the transnational social movements against sweatshops and globalization: For example, Davis (1998) cites the example of women of color in the United States working across differences to form a women's health alliance. Blofeld (2003) argues that women in Spain were able to overcome class equality to a greater degree than were women activists in Chile; Tormos (2014) tells a similar story about the anti-sweatshop movement.

Fortunately, solidarity need not require a shared identity or interest in any deep sense. Indeed, there is evidence that much political action is situational, arising out of a contingent set of circumstances that throw people together into the same situation, or alerts them to a shared concern. Social groups are more like "series"- loose, situational, contextually bound and defined groupings (Young 2004), than they are like nations, with thick, shared identities. Social categories are shifting and multiple, intersecting and dynamic, rather than fixed (Hancock 2011; Lugones 1994).

Recognizing difference can be a strategy for building solidarity, by building new, more inclusive identities. Indeed, many contemporary social movements affirm diversity in membership as a core aspect of movement identity (Ward 2008; Hancock 2011). For example, some scholars argue that the strength of the LGBT movement is its emphasis on internal diversity, on deviance from all norms (Ward 2008). Moreover, difference is not necessarily opposed to solidarity: Movements can include people by identifying them in their specificity, calling out to them in their thicker, more salient identity groups (Dean 1996; Ward 2008; Weldon 2006 Young 1990)

These arguments suggest that neither the existence of different identities within a movement, nor their affirmation, need necessarily be a barrier to solidarity, and in fact, can be a strength in some circumstances. Still, these arguments leave unaddressed what the basis for solidarity among these diverse constituencies is in the first place. Moreover, the problem of building solidarity is not primarily one of tolerating or even celebrating difference (Ward 2008). Rather, it is about relations of power and domination among groups (Young 2000; MacKinnon 1989).

Micro-strategies

Some writers focus on actions at the individual level that can further social solidarity. These include engaging in consciousness-raising, signaling to others your concern for inclusiveness and commitment to justice, developing empathy, and the like (Ward 2008; Hancock 2011). These micro-level strategies may well be essential to ensure that organizations are comprised of individuals who work well together, who communicate better, and the like. They may also make individuals more successful in their organizing efforts. The question here, though, is more of an organizational one than an individual one, though these can never be entirely separated. Indeed, ultimately, even a dialogic relationship requires a counterpart, and if one's efforts to build connections or raise consciousness are unwelcome, there may be little one can do. Of course, organizations can adopt policies that require training that raises consciousness or awareness, or sets the ground rules for interactions. Such measures may be essential, in fact, to organizational progress. But these then become questions of organizational practice or strategy, a question we address further below. But before we turn to questions of strategy, it is important to consider whether there are limits or advantages for particular types of organizations or issues in particular circumstances which make them more or less likely to be successful in building solidarity.

Interests

Some scholars focus on the role of interests in motivating coordinated political behavior. For example, some scholars of labor organizing link organizing strategies to unemployment, characteristics of the economic sector, and other objectively determined economic conditions (For a nice discussion of this line of argument see Anner 2009). Similarly, O'Brien et al (2000) argue that the reason the movement against gender violence has been successful while women's international movements for economic justice have failed is that in the latter case women are divided by conflicts of economic interest while in the former case no such conflict arises: Indeed, violence against women is an "issue which united women across a vast ideological spectrum, and where gains in the physical security and human rights of particular groups of women are seen as gains for all, not as potentially detracting from the opportunities of others" (O'Brien et al 2000, 40). One would expect that cooperation is most likely to emerge where activists share common interests, or at least do not have to overcome conflicts of interests. While few scholars are so unsophisticated as to claim that common interests alone will determine mobilization, common interests have long been seen as central to mobilization, and as an important factor underpinning or enabling mobilization (Tilly 1978).

However, emphasizing shared interests as a basis for social movement mobilization is increasingly problematic for analyzing social mobilization, especially when examining the diverse interest and identities that characterize transnational movements. In the context of such diversity, shared interests can be difficult to discern. More importantly, perhaps, emphasizing shared or universal interests may undermine political solidarity or success in the long term, as it can lead to a focus on issues that advantage privileged groups (Strolovitch 2008). The problem is not that women never share any interests. Rather, the search for and emphasis on universal concerns privileges heterosexual, middle class and otherwise advantaged groups of women. The problem is both political and analytical: As Nancy Burns puts it, "we will get the story wrong if we focus on the things all women or all men share" (2007, 140).

Analytically, the question of how to define interests as distinct from subjective preferences or values is also a thorny one. Often, what might seem like the best interests in objective terms seem to diverge from a groups' expressed interests. Many people are politically active or otherwise organize against their own interests, or in ways that can be seen as being against their own interests (Frank 2005). Democratic theorists have generally been uncomfortable with suggesting that people are ignorant of what is best for them (Vickers 2006).[7] On the other hand, merely accepting expressed preferences as interests raises problems of its own: For example, women's expressed interests vary across groups and over time (O'Brien 2004). The information people receive may be systematically distorted or manipulated, and they may be socialized to accept ideas that go against their interests. This may be mitigated when oppressed groups self-organize (Vickers 2006, Lukes 2005; Morris and Braine 2001). But even self-organized groups

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[7] See also Sapiro (1981) and Diamond and Hartsock (1981) on objective and subjective interests.

express varying preferences over time and across groups, and some organized groups seem to oppose policies that might operate in their favor.

As noted, mobilization in social movements, and political solidarity, is importantly influenced by ideas and values, not just interests (Mansbridge 1995; McBride and Mazur 2010; Snow and Benford 2000; Risse-Kappan 2000; Anner 2009). Activists more often cast their arguments in terms of justice and inequality than in advancing material gains for a particular group (hooks 1990; Mohanty 2003; Young). The concept of solidarity must capture the important role of ideational, normative phenomena *and* link it to the social structures that organize power in its diverse forms. We need an account of the impressive political solidarity of transnational social movement that can account for the deep conflicts of interest among women and the lack of shared identities. The concept of interests cannot do these things (Weldon 2011).

If shared interests translated directly into cooperation, we would expect there to be little lag time between activists discussing an issue or problem and acting collectively to address the problem. If (as seems more likely) shared interests are merely *enabling* for cooperation (for example, necessary but not sufficient), then it could take some time for cooperation to emerge even when interests are shared. But how do we know it is really that underlying interests are finally becoming salient, rather than that they are merely being framed differently? As noted, activists often devise ways of reframing conflicts of interests to portray them as shared interests.

Activists are more successful at devising such shared interest frames when they engage in inclusive deliberations. Sorting out the sequencing of events is critical for sorting out which theoretical account best describes the causal chain: Did activists perceive their shared interests prior to achieving success at cooperation, or did the reframing of interests emerge from more inclusive deliberations? I argue it is the latter.

Even for those who recognize the problematic nature of the idea of shared interests, the concern persists that if groups do not share interests, then there is no basis for political solidarity for marginalized groups. It eliminates the subject just as marginalized groups were about to claim a subjectivity of their own; it is politically disempowering in undermining the efforts of marginalized groups to organize on their own behalf. For example, feminist analysts worry about being unable to conceptualize women as a political group: As Vickers (2006) puts it: "Where women do not articulate a common voice…democracies cannot be deepened by the feminist project" (9) and "Being able to assert what are 'women's' best interests in a particular context enables contestation when men are making laws and allocations or formulating policies based on *their* images of what is good for 'the universal woman' (17).

Some scholars have tried to reconstitute the idea of women's common interests as a sort of contextual, politically-pragmatic claim, based on empirical analysis: We could speak of women's common (but not universal) interests where such interests could be demonstrated (Vickers 2006). In order to avoid attributing interests to women based on expert opinion, we should look to women's own expression of these interests in contexts

where they self-organize. This approach leaves many troubling questions unanswered, however: What do we make of women who fail to identify with each other at one point in time, who nevertheless forge strong bonds of solidarity and agree on a political agenda at a later time, as happened in the global women's movement? Does this common interest suddenly emerge? Nor does this approach solve the political problem: Women need to speak with a common voice not only where we have common interests, but *especially* in those instances when we have conflicting interests, when the interests of marginalized groups of women are most likely to be overlooked.

Perspective as a Basis for Deep or Reflective Political Solidarity

Analytically, a better way of linking women's social position to women's movements, and to evaluate women's substantive political representation, is to focus on group perspective (Young 1997, 2000), and the relationships to movement identities and values. Rather than being prior to mobilization, movement identities emerge from mobilization, and group perspectives are crafted in the process.

While the members of a social group may have divergent experiences, identities and interests, they are designated as a social collective or *series* by social institutions, by social practice, by what Sartre calls practico-inert structures. Constituting a series does not require a shared experience; It means that some external object, practice or process links the members of the collectivity. This link may constitute a trivial aspect of their consciousness or subjectivity but it is a social fact. Bus-riders, for example, are objectively linked by virtue of waiting for the same bus (Young 1997). This does not mean the riders have the same experiences or interests, but they are part of the operation of a larger system. Their subjectively reported experience helps us to understand the actual operation of the bus route.

In order to understand broader processes of social organization, we need to map the connections across groups as well as understand the many different ways that members of a series subjectively experience belonging to the group. Greater diversity in the individual and group subjectivities mapped provides more information about how a social structure operates.

Any particular organized group will always be partial in relation to the larger series of which they are a part, say "women" or "domestic workers" or "minority sexualities". But every person has some information about the operation of social structures in her personal experience. This element of personal experience may not be salient; it may be in the background. However, when people organize in particular groups, such as women or workers, their membership in the broader series is foregrounded, made visible. Such groups of women have more information about the broader series than individuals, and more diverse groups offer more insight.

This idea picks up on the fundamental insight expressed by the Combahee River Collective: "There is also undeniably a personal genesis for Black Feminism, that is, the political realization that comes from the seemingly personal experiences of individual

Black women's lives. Black feminists and many more Black women who do not define themselves as feminists have all experienced sexual oppression as a constant factor in our day-to-day existence. …However, we had no way of conceptualizing what was so apparent to us, what we knew was really happening." And "This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression."

Motivations for mobilizing may be different for different groups. Specific political mobilizations emerge from series, latent social groupings, because of threats or opportunities that compel them to emerge. This may result in several different groups emerging at the same time, with related, opposed, or unrelated goals or aims. Once mobilized, these groups can seek to form a broader or deeper political solidarity, or they can fail to attract more adherents or cooperating partners. When activists or organizations engage each other as equals in an open-ended discussion to identify areas of possible collaboration, or seek to persuade each other of the importance of their various priorities, they are more likely to discover new and more successful ways to frame issues and build broader coalitions.

 Groups that seek to forge broader connections, for example cross-national ones, often engage potential organizing partners in discussion. Such voluntary coordination through linguistic interaction is a powerful basis for coordinating social and political action, and is distinct from efforts to coordinate through market mechanisms (such as money) or bureaucratic mechanisms (such as demanding compliance with rules on the basis of their authority rather than their legitimacy) (Habermas [1962] 1989; 1987). The closer these discussions are to the ideal of a "discussion free from domination," the more powerful they will be in generating lasting political solidarity, and ultimately, political influence. The ideal here is of a discussion in which the participants engage as equals, where the only force is the "force of the better argument," and other considerations do not intrude upon the discussion.

Deliberation need not sublimate particular identity groups in order to build these coalitions. Indeed, we need a series of overlapping deliberations, not just one discussion, to build a strong coalition (Dean 1996; Fraser 1992; Young 2000). Deliberation in particular marginalized groups, aimed at discerning distinctive perspectives or issues that are obscured in more general groups, is a particularly powerful tool for generating knowledge of social structure and for developing new concepts and identities, new bases for solidarity (Young 2000; Weldon 2011).

Where members of a series freely organize to seek to change the reality they face, then, they generate social knowledge. The issues they discuss reflect the social landscape they see. This set of issues comprises the *perspective* of the series (Young 2000). Substantive representation of marginalized groups, such as women, is accomplished when these issues are accorded weight in democratic deliberations or policymaking processes. Perspective is a plural concept: A group perspective is comprised by the perspectives of

sub-groups. We can tell which groups of are substantively represented by examining whether their priorities are given weight and attention.

Thinking of marginalized groups such as women as a series with a social perspective allows us to recognize, for example, that women are connected as women by the way gendered norms about responsibility for children combine with international economic processes that create significant inequalities, and even relations of exploitation, among women. This connection can ground a shared commitment to address these inequalities but it does not necessarily suggest a common interest or identity. Indeed, developing a shared program to address such issues requires women to overcome serious conflicts of interest.

Neither the connection nor the conflicts are determinative of political action; but organizing and developing better ideas can produce a solidarity that builds on this connection (Mohanty 2003). This solidarity can affirm both universality of commitment and the particular identities and concerns of particular groups, the ideal of *reflective solidarity* (Dean 1996). This deeper connection also goes beyond mere tolerance or public-spiritedness, affirming a deeper sense of concern and empathy, a sense of *deep political solidarity*.

Inclusive Deliberation

Deliberation has long been seen as an ideal by democratic theorists (eg. Bohman and Rehg 1997; Dryzek 2000). A critique of deliberation, particularly relevant for our question, is whether this ideal can ever be realized, or even approximated, in practice. In reality, counterparts in discussions are never free from their bodily identities, and it is not clear we want them to be, if we seek to generate social knowledge through deliberation, as suggested above. Moreover, passion, rhetoric and other modes and dimensions of communication sometimes seen as anti-thetical to dispassionate, rational discussion, are critical to inclusive communication (Young 2000). Given the many subtle and not-so-subtle ways that powerful groups dominate discussions, and that marginalized groups are sidelined in such discussions, how can we structure discussions among activists, organizations, or other interlocutors so that we approximate a "discussions free from domination", that can illuminate the pathway to solidarity? How can such political discussions be structured in order to minimize the corrupting influence of money and bureaucratic, command-and control rule following, and social domination in order to ensure that all can participate in discussions on equal footing? What measures can we take in order to ensure that our deliberations bring us closer to a deeper, more reflective forms of political solidarity?

Descriptive Representation

One mechanism that activists and scholars alike advocate for improving deliberations from legislatures to social movements to not-for-profits is descriptive representation, the politics of presence (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1998; Williams 1998). It is important to note that this need not be about greater numbers, nor even about a critical mass, as much

as it is about members of marginalized groups as critical actors, in critical positions or moments (Childs et al 2006). Such descriptive representation helps to displace social norms that see some groups as natural leaders or as the proper holders of power (Mansbridge 1999). Ensuring the physical presence of members of marginalized groups can improve trust and legitimacy, smoothing the way for meaningful discussion uncorrupted by misunderstanding and failures to correct false assumptions, particularly where conflicts of interest might be perceived (Williams 1998). Last, descriptive representation can sometimes enhance substantive representation, that is, effective articulation of the views of marginalized groups, especially where these views or concerns are uncrystallized and not widely discussed in the dominant public sphere or discussion (Mansbridge 1999).

For these reasons, we might expect physical presence of members of marginalized groups, particularly in the leadership of key organizations, to help to build coalitions. However, extant scholarship also cautions against expecting too much from merely changing the bodies in institutions without altering institutional norms, structures and practices that advantage some groups over others (MacKinnon 1989; Young 1990; Weldon 2002; Brown 1992). In order to empower these descriptive representatives, a broader context of social contestation and organizational support is necessary.

It is also important to recognize the difference between individuals acting alone and collective efforts to articulate the views of marginalized groups. If we accept arguments about categorical multiplicity (Hancock 2011), we know that one person can never speak for a complex social group based on their own experience (Weldon 2002). Moreover, a more diverse set of descriptive representatives can be more helpful than a less diverse set particularly where they can deliberate about and discuss their shared and unique experiences (Weldon 2011; cf. Dovi 2002). These considerations point to the importance of organizational structure and context, a point to which we return below.

Substantive Representation

Some scholars have suggested that rather than focusing merely on the presence of members of marginalized groups, we should focus on efforts to ensure that the views and concerns of marginalized groups are given adequate weight in organizational deliberations (Strolovitch 2008; Weldon 2002, 2011). One way of making sure the concerns of intersectionally marginalized groups do not slip through the cracks of coalitions, or otherwise get systematically overlooked, is to systematically advantage the views, proposals, or ideas of these groups. The idea is to create a sort of affirmative action for ideas (Strolovitch 2008). This is especially important in building inclusive coalitions. It is easy for such coalitions to emphasize common ground, leaving seemingly particularistic or "narrower" concerns for smaller groups to take up on their own. In order to counter this tendency, organizations or partners in coalitions should make a conscious effort to assign additional weight to the issues and concerns of marginalized groups. Though this may seem to be a narrowing of focus, in fact, it cements the coalition by ensuring all parts of the team see themselves as represented in the agenda and priorities of the group.

Autonomous Self-Organization

This approach depends not only on the ability of marginalized groups to articulate and express their distinctive perspectives and concerns, but also on the ability of the broader group to hear, to recognize and assign greater weight to the views of marginalized groups. Each of these is a challenge. Marginalized groups may lack the language or opportunity to develop ideas about their priorities or concerns. This is one reason why creating safe spaces, and organizing autonomously, has been so important for marginalized groups (Weldon 2002; 2011). These safe, dedicated organizational spaces constitute counter-publics, where groups may withdraw from seemingly hostile public spheres to regroup and constitute themselves and their priorities. They act as launching pads and signaling mechanisms to force the broader groups to listen and to recognize the concerns and proposals emanating from the group as having some weight. Thus, autonomous self-organization aimed at articulating the views of marginalized groups is critical to ensuring greater inclusiveness. Far from undermining solidarity, affirming difference, and enabling the articulation of dissent, is essential to strengthening these bonds (Dean 1996; Weldon 2006). Greater inclusiveness strengthens, rather than weakens, solidarity (Tilly 1978; Weldon 2006).

The Elements of Inclusive Deliberation

In summary then, transnational organizing efforts are likely to be more successful when they use inclusive deliberation to coordinate their actions. Such inclusive deliberation involves established rules of organizational structure and decision-making that ensure that marginalized groups have presence and voice in deliberations. This includes:

1. Organizational practices that encourage learning and awareness on the part of all participants as a background condition (Ward; Hancock). This may be most practical for established organizations with a clearly defined membership
2. Descriptive representation of marginalized groups, especially in the leadership of the organization but also throughout
3. Support for autonomous self-organizing of marginalized groups, such as caucuses or freestanding groups working as partners
4. Institutional mechanisms to ensure that extra weight and attention is given to the consideration of the views and proposals of marginalized groups (for example, those developed by self-organized groups)
5. Institutional mechanisms that regularize dissent and ensure there are opportunities to introduce multiple views.

Below, we discuss the ways that these elements might seem to have contributed to the success or failure of a series of transnational organizing efforts.

Transnational Movements

Transnational movements have been organized on many issues and involve many different types of groups. Interestingly, there are parallels and connections between all kinds of groups, making delineation of some of these movements an analytic rather than a political project. Some, but not all of these new transnational movements are women's movements, and only some of these are feminist. Women's transnational organizing has a long history, but recently has gathered steam, with a proliferation of organizations and networks, especially after the Beijing Conference since 1995 (Moghadam 2009). We begin our examination of inclusive deliberation in transnational feminist movements with an examination of a couple of instances of global feminist activism. We then turn to examine instances of transnational organizing that involve both women's activism and feminist activism but that are broader in focus in terms of the coalitions they seek to construct, and focused on economic interests. Even here, we show, greater inclusivity is he key to success.

Global Feminist Organizing

Although some have defined transnational feminist organizing as international feminist mobilizations involving women seeking to develop a collective identity (Hawkesworth), we would argue that collective identity is a byproduct of feminist organizing, rather than either a precondition or a goal. Rather than a project in pursuit of identity, global feminist activism, best understood as a movement of movements, seeks to further gender justice, defined in a variety of different ways (Moghadam 2009; Young 2000).

The idea of women as a series with a social perspective explains why there is the potential for global organizing without positing common interests among women. Although there is the potential to create political solidarity among women by virtue of their membership in the series, there is not necessarily a shared interest or identity, nor is discovering common interests or goals a primary goal for activists. Indeed, in the initial phases of women's global organizing, women activists were unable to come together around a common agenda, as they were divided, by region, religion, sexuality, race, and other political categories (Weldon 2006). In spite of these divisions, women were able to generate solidarity by identifying a set of priorities they shared. It is important to recognize that this was not a process through which common **interests** were revealed. It was a process of building solidarity by recognizing diversity among women and developing new ideas (e.g., a broadened concept of violence against women) that better captured the experiences of the world's women. And the women in these movements who push for reproductive freedom, for equality in family law or to end violence against women did so not necessarily because it is in their own interest but rather, because it reflects their shared commitment to gender justice.

Global Movement on Gender Violence

It is easy to forget that in the 1980s, even mainstream human rights groups and international law did not consider rape, domestic violence, and other forms of violence against women to be violations of human rights unless they were perpetrated by the state. By the end of the 1990s, many of these human rights groups had made violence against

women a priority area. More than 170 governments had signed a declaration against violence against women, and women in more than 20 countries won the right to seek redress for human rights violations in the international community (through the Optional Protocol).[8] In addition to formal legal rights, considerable governmental and intergovernmental resources have been dedicated to fighting violence against women in both developed and developing countries (Weldon, 2002). For example, a UNIFEM initiative has funded anti-violence initiatives in more than 70 countries since 1997 (Heyzer, 2003). A strong, united transnational movement on gender violence was critical to these changes in civil society and national policy and global governance (Weldon 2006; Htun and Weldon 2012).How did this transnational movement emerge?

Women's transnational organizing, as noted, goes back at least to the 19th century, when women organized against war and violence and for peace, for example, establishing the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), now headquartered in Geneva. But transnational organizing focused specifically on gender violence took on particular momentum and intensity in the mid-seventies. Violence against women was on the agenda of the transnational women's movement from about the mid-seventies (Joachim 1999). In 1974, ISIS, an international feminist network focusing on violence against women, was formed (Fraser, 1987).[9]

Most of the early discussion on VAW took place outside the UN process of intergovernmental meetings on women. In 1975, feminist analysis of the connections between violence against women and male dominance was expressed in international meetings: At the intergovernmental meeting in Mexico City, Elizabeth Reid, a feminist activist and leader of the Australian government delegation, argued that the basis of violence against women was sexism, and that such violence (and the concomitant lack of social condemnation) was the result of women's low social status.[10] But many feminists rejected the UN as a venue for promoting women's rights at all. They criticized the NGO Tribune for being too focused on the governmental agenda. Some activists attending NGO fora in 1975 and 1980 used the Tribune mainly to criticize their own governments (United Nations, 1975b; Fraser, 1987). Others wished to organize marches on the official intergovernmental meeting. The divisions among activists were so salient and severe that some despaired for the future not only of NGO fora at Women's Conferences, but for the UN's willingness to sponsor future NGO fora at *any* conference (Fraser, 1987). UN officials reportedly worried about how the disorder at the Tribune reflected on the UN (Fraser, 1987).

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[8] On the optional protocol see the extensive webpage provided by the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) at the UN, which includes the text of the optional protocol and other helpful information (United Nations, 2004).
[9] Joachim (1999) reports that ISIS was formed as a result of the 1976 Tribunal, but a primary observer reports that the formation of the network preceded the 1975 Conference in Mexico (Fraser, 1987).
[10] See Statement by Ms. Elizabeth Reid, Leader of the Australian Delegation (exerpts) *Women's International Network News* 1 (1) Oct.1975 p.5.

Criticizing the 1975 UN Conference for its inattention to violence against women, some activists organized (partially as an alternative) the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women in Brussels in 1976. The Tribunal aimed to focus on crimes against women. More than two thousand women from approximately forty countries participated. Topics ranged from forced motherhood to economic crimes to traffic in women (Women's International Network News, 1975; Joachim, 1999, 145). In the same year, Fran Hosken presented an argument in Women's International News (WIN) that violence against women was a pressing international issue, and reviewed two important feminist books on rape (Hosken, 1976; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

Through the early 1980s, divisions among women continued to prevent activists from cooperating to place violence on the international governmental agenda, in spite of the opportunity presented by another intergovernmental conference, the Second UN Conference on Women in Copenhagen. Violence against women was definitely discussed at the NGO forum that paralleled the Conference (Fraser, 1987). Efforts to discuss Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) made the North-South division manifest. Several Northern women's organizations condemned the practice as "barbaric" and symptomatic of "primitive societies", while several Southern organizations defended it as a cultural practice and criticized the Northern groups for imperialism (Joachim, 1999, 145; Ngara, 1985). Governments were similarly divided.[11]

It was at the NGO meetings held parallel to the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985 that a pathway to cooperation began to be developed. This conference was led by Southern women, and an unprecedented number of southern women attended. Activists consciously laid out their practical focus on finding the best ways to cooperate to influence governments, and explicitly eschewed any effort to create a shared identity or total agreement. Dissent and difference were expected.

Southern women had begun to organize themselves, and the issues of VAW emerged from their discussions in a way that contextualized the concern as relevant to the lives of Southern women. Gender violence was framed as a series of related violations, present in every culture though in a variety of forms, some of which might be culturally specific. This divorced concerns about some types of violence (such as FGM) from characterizations of particular cultures (and by implication, peoples) as particularly barbaric or uncivilized. All societies were afflicted by a variety of forms of VAW, rooted in sexism rather than any special cultural deficiency.

This new framing was adopted by the broader movement. By the early 1990s, the global movement on gender violence was able to transform a world conference on human rights (which had not necessarily been intended to focus on women) into a conference on women's rights. The slogan Women's Rights are Human Rights emerged from this

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[11] The Programme of Action adopted at Copenhagen in 1980 contains language condemning female genital mutilation but also condemning international campaigns against such practices. Such contradictory language reflects the controversial nature of the issue in the intergovernmental discussions (Fraser, 1987)

process. The leadership and self-organization of Southern women was critical to building the united front that forced even recalcitrant governments to face the omnipresence of gender violence in its various forms. Descriptive representation and self-organization translated into a movement that more fully represented women from the East and the West, and from the Global North and South, speaking in their own voices. Women from all over the world, including the South, protested, signed petitions, and gave testimony at the Conference.

In sum, then, this global movement was able to maintain cooperation by developing inclusive procedures for intra-movement policy deliberations in which marginalized participants had a greater voice (Weldon 2006a). This produced policy decisions and political strategies that more members felt they could support. This put the movement in a position to lobby for and take advantage of the resources offered by governments and international institutions, contributing to their success in organizing and influencing policy. Stronger transnational movements are more likely to influence policy outcomes (Weldon 2002; 2006b; 2011; Htun and Weldon 2012).

Other studies have suggested that strategic issue-framing and the political opportunity structure accounted for the success of the movement against gender violence. But the opportunity structure, while important, provides an incomplete account of the development of the movement. The successful framing of violence against women as a human rights issue did contribute to the movement's success in influencing policy. But this framing resulted from cooperation among women, rather than caused it. The emergence of norms of inclusivity among activists, then, helps complete the picture, illuminating how bitterly divided activists were able to come together to forge an influential transnational movement. This suggests that those seeking to develop cooperation can further this goal by adopting more inclusive decision-making procedures, and need not worry that movement adherents do not share a common identity. Nor need they concern themselves with arguments that affirming shared identities necessarily undermines broader solidarity projects.

Global Movement on Reproductive Rights

A similar story can be told about the transnational movement for women's reproductive rights. Initially, the elitist, policy-oriented wing of the movement aimed to exclude those who disagreed with them, and they did not take measures to ensure that Southern women were well-represented in their deliberations. But these policy-oriented pragmatists were unable to unify the movement around a policy program. Organizers eventually responded to criticism from these activists, organizing meetings that aimed to be more inclusive. In Rio de Janeiro in 1993, women's health activists met with the goal of uniting women from the North and South. As Higer notes: "[O]rganizers seemed especially sensitive to ensuring diversity of participants and giving women from Southern countries an ample voice….." (134). The effort was seen as successful with the Southern women reportedly taking the lead while Northern women kept a lower profile. At this five-day conference, activists drafted a twenty-one point statement in a process that was "remarkable for its democratic participation and for building solidarity among

diversity"(134). The statement apparently noted differences of opinion where they existed rather than trying to force a consensus. This conference "helped to produce cohesion in the movement" and produced a "sense of solidarity" that was "especially valuable for feminist lobbying efforts at the final Prepcom …" (135).

At Cairo, though, the pragmatists later returned to the strategy of emphasizing some elements of the agenda at the expense of others (the development–related points). It is for this reason that the final Plan of Action is silent on these development related issues. Divisions among women became increasingly salient after the Conference, likely weakening the movement (Higer 1999).

In the area of reproductive rights, then, transnational women's movement activists used inclusive measures to overcome difference, but then abandoned a more inclusive agenda for what they considered a more pragmatic one. These "pragmatic" moves to accommodate government agendas produced short-term policy success but weakened the movement in the long term (Higer, 1999,139).

Global Movement Against Sweatshops

Let us turn now to another important issue addressed by transnational organizing, where women's rights activists partnered with activists focused on other constituencies and issues. Unlike VAW or Reproductive rights, this issue directly confronts class relations, and requires regulating corporations and other market actors (Htun and Weldon 2010). Moreover, some argue that this is the kind of issue where international action is least effective, as business and market interests trump concerns about human rights or equal status (Elman 2008; O'Brien et al). Yet here too, we find that increasing inclusivity is the key to solidarity, and this, indirectly, a source of greater policy influence (Tormos 2014; Weldon 2006a; 2006b)

How did the global movement against sweatshops achieve solidarity and overcome social group differences? What were the roles of activist identities, interests, and values in shaping the movement, its goals, and its mechanisms of policy influence? What explains the anti-sweatshop movement's ability to push governments and multinational corporations (MNCs) to address their claims? A review of the history of the anti-sweatshop movement allows for an analysis of possible explanations for the movement's success.

Labor unions and consumer leagues have a rich history of organizing against sweatshop working conditions and unsafe workplace environments. In the 1980s, human rights and women's organizations began to organize campaigns aimed at raising awareness about the issue of sweatshops. By the mid-1990s, student activists in the United States, Canada, and Europe organized their own anti-sweatshop organizations and deployed a creative array of direct action tactics aimed at pushing their universities to sever ties with MNCs implicated in labor rights violations abroad. In the late-1990s, anti-sweatshop campaigns had gained international attention, pushing national governments and MNCs to take voluntary actions to address labor rights violations. Early anti-sweatshop campaigns led

to important but insufficient victories, with some MNCs adopting voluntary codes of conduct and governments of exporting countries adopting labor standards and improving labor policy implementation. The creation of the Worker Rights Consortium in 2000 also placed significant pressures on retailers to avoid outsourcing university apparel from suppliers implicated in labor rights violations. Yet, MNCs resisted legally binding measures that would make them responsible for labor rights violations and workplace disasters in supplying factories. It was not until 2013 that major manufacturing companies agreed to legally binding terms to ensure workplace safety in the factories of all suppliers producing for signatory companies.

Why did anti-sweatshop activism see a significant increase in its policy influence after 2010? We argue that the transnational activist efforts against sweatshops had to overcome challenges to building and sustaining transnational activist ties before exerting greater policy influence over MNCs. Building and sustaining transnational ties in the anti-sweatshop movement was possible by making the movement more inclusive and supporting the autonomous organization of workers in supplier factories.

The global movement against sweatshops emerged out efforts of labor and human rights activists that gained international attention throughout the 1990s. In their early stages, these efforts were not jointly coordinated. Groups aiming to place the issue in governmental agendas were divided on how to address the problem of sweatshops. While labor unions in the United States pushed the government to adopt protectionist measures and a mixture of groups in the US and Europe called for consumer boycotts of sweatshop manufactured goods, advocacy groups in exporting countries opposed such efforts, denouncing the detrimental effects of protectionist measures and consumer boycotts over their country's economic development and their workers' job security. These divisions obstructed the creation of solidary ties that cut across social group differences. These early stages of anti-sweatshop campaigns achieved incremental labor policy changes, mostly in industrialized countries, and inspired some voluntary action on sweatshops by governments and MNCs.

In the mid-1990s anti-sweatshop groups in the US and Europe began to shift their organizing structure and their tactics for exerting policy influence. Advocacy groups, human rights organizations, and student activists in Europe and the US began to change their tactics of consumer boycotts and advocating for protectionist measures. Instead, these groups, mostly in the global North, began to target MNCs to take responsibility for labor violations in factories supplying their products. Advocacy groups in Europe and the US also began to support the creation, recognition, and autonomy of labor unions of factory workers.

The anti-sweatshop movement's adoption of norms of inclusion and solidarity can be traced in the founding documents and actions of various anti-sweatshop organizations. United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) is one of many anti-sweatshop organizations that has adopted norms of solidarity and inclusion as part of its organizing philosophy and organizational structure. USAS is a US-based, student-led organization with chapters in over 150 US universities that has successfully coordinated anti-

sweatshop campaigns since 1997 and was responsible for the formation of the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC). In a 2009 conference, the USAS membership ratified these norms of solidarity and inclusion. The organization's organizing philosophy invokes a model of solidarity that challenges power relations and addresses marginalization within the movement (USAS 2009). The group's organizing philosophy states: "We believe that a pluralist approach to ideological positions and practices strengthens our movement. We encourage a rigorous internal political dialogue, which strengthens our strategic analysis and effectiveness" (USAS 2009). This documents also states that the organization seeks inclusive communication, diversity of tactics, developing social movement leadership within oppressed groups, and struggles against oppression "within our society, within our organizations, and within ourselves" (USAS 2009). USAS campaigns have focused on getting governments and employers to recognize and negotiate with independent labor unions in garment exporting countries.

IndustriALL, a global union founded in 2012 that gained prominence for its involvement in the brokerage of the 2013 Bangladesh Accord on Building and Fire Safety, is another organization involved in the anti-sweatshop movement that has adopted norms of inclusion. These norms are most clearly articulated in the organization's Action Plan (IndustriALL n.d.). IndustriALL's Action Plan states that the organization shall fulfill its mission by building stronger unions, overcoming divisions in the union movement, supporting the formation of autonomous labor unions throughout the world, organizing solidarity campaigns, organizing workers throughout the global supply chain, building relationships with NGOs and other global unions, promoting the unionization of precarious workers, working on agreements with MNCs that enable negotiations with workers, challenging the mobility of global capital, moving towards environmentally sustainable manufacturing practices, collaborating with broader global justice efforts, among many other mechanisms.

IndustriALL also seeks to challenge the historical underrepresentation of women in the labor movement and its leadership. The organization's Action Plan includes a statement on "Equal Rights and Women's Participation" that calls for action against discrimination in all forms, removing barriers to women's participation and representation at all level in their unions, and pushing for equal pay measures. IndustriALL is governed by an executive committee with 60 members, with seats allocated to representatives of affiliated unions from 6 regions: Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe. Out of these 60 seats, at least 18 seats are reserved for women. The highest authority of IndustriALL is its Congress, which will take place every four years. IndustriALL's Article 11, on participation in the Congress, stipulates: "In forming their delegations, affiliates shall consider the appropriate gender and sectoral balance. At least thirty per cent of the delegates shall be women, where this is practical given the size of the delegation."

The formation and strengthening of USAS also signaled a shift in anti-sweatshop organizing in the late 1990s, as US-based organizations moved away from pushing for consumer boycotts and protectionist measures. USAS emerged in 1997, after US college students that participated in an AFL-CIO sponsored internship program called Union

Summer decided to organize a student-led effort against sweatshops in their college campuses. In 2000, after the Clinton Administration's Apparel Industry Partnership failed to secure the independent monitoring of factories, USAS went on to form the WRC.

The WRC has been conducing independent investigations of factories and labor rights violations for the past 15 years.[12] WRC has supported the work of labor unions in garment exporting countries and responded to requests by workers in factories in Honduras, Bangladesh, and Cambodia, among other countries for investigations and capacity building efforts. The AFL-CIO participates in the WRC, but its involvement in the anti-sweatshop movement is also evidenced in its presence in about 60 countries and work supporting more than 400 labor unions. In 1997, the AFL-CIO founded the Solidarity Center, a non-profit international worker rights organization that "assists workers around the world who are struggling to achieve safe and healthy workplaces, family-supporting wages, social protections and a voice on the job." (Solidarity Center 2015). The Solidarity Center's field offices host professional staff that assists the work of local labor unions and workers seeking to organize autonomously. The Center also seeks to empower women within unions and to increase women's participation in labor movements.[13]

In the case of the global movement against sweatshops, success entails the adoption and enforcement of labor protections along the entire supply chain of the global manufacturing industry. The structure of the global economy facilitates the mobility of the operations of MNCs. MNCs may halt operations in countries that decide to adopt and implement labor protections for their workers. MNCs aiming to avoid recognizing international labor standards may set up shop in special economic zones or in countries that either do not have strong labor protections in place or do not enforce them. Consequently, for an anti-sweatshop movement to achieve success in eradicating sweatshop labor conditions, it must target multiple powerful actors, including governments as well as MNCs.

The global movement against sweatshops has yet to achieve such a goal. The labor rights victories of anti-sweatshop campaigns in Latin America throughout the late 1990s and

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[12] The WRC's work and deliberations have been documented for the past 14 years. These minutes also document the interaction between the WRC and local independent unions and NGOs in garment exporting countries. See the meeting minutes for the governing board can be found on the WRC website (http://www.workersrights.org/about/minutes.asp)

[13] One such effort is documented in the following report on a workshop with women workers in Brazil: http://www.solidaritycenter.org/concurrent-workshops-%E2%80%A2-union-strategies-to-increase-womens-participation-in-brazil-perspectives-from-industrial-public-and-service-sectors/. The Solidarity Center's Facebook page also documents worker-led direct action efforts and safety trainings in garment-exporting countries, such as Bangladesh (See <https://www.facebook.com/solidaritycenter?fref=ts> and <https://www.facebook.com/solidaritycenter/photos/a.115790203656.92128.112940868656/10152674523703657/?type=1&theater>).

2000s were short lived as MNCs shifted their operations to countries without labor protections or without the institutional capacity to enforce basic labor standards (Ambruster-Sandoval 2005). Students, human rights organizations, intellectuals, consumer leagues, and labor unions in the United States and Europe contributed to the extension of labor protections beyond the global North by creating the Worker Rights Consortium and pushing universities with major apparel contracts to break ties with retailers that supplied from factories that committed labor rights violations.[14]

In 2013 an international amalgamation of labor unions, MNCs, and intergovernmental bodies brokered and signed the first global legally binding agreement to extend labor protections to workers in the garment industry, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. Under this accord, signatory MNCs assume legal and financial responsibility over the labor rights violations of their suppliers. MNCs also committed to recognizing and supporting the creation of worker safety committees. The accord also secured funding for the goal of empowering workers through extensive training programs, complaints mechanisms, and the right to refuse to work in unsafe workplace environments.[15] The Accord can be considered a success at the global level since the agreement covers all suppliers producing products for the signatory MNCs. Major MNCs in the global manufacturing industry have signed on to the Accord and thereby elevated the signing of this agreement to an industry level norm of labor standards.

Global Justice Movement

Coming back to the World Social Forum, then, one of the reasons the Global Justice Movement has been able to sustain its impressive record of transnational organizing over more than a decade is its efforts to ensure its continued inclusivity. Moghadam notes that the roots of the global justice movement are in the South, and that the frameworks and ideas expressed at the Conference constitute an epistemology of the South. It is also a "movement of movements," a structure that allows many groups to participate while organizing on their own terms. Feminists, Indigenous Peoples, Environmentalists and many other constituencies and groups participate and further their aims through the global justice movement, without becoming equated with it. The World Social Forum employs a consciously deliberative structure: The Charter of Principles emphasizes its function as a deliberative space, a space for the "free flow of ideas." (WSF Charter; Moghadam 2009). Yet the WSF does not claim that these deliberations are representative of a specific group, or even of the whole movement, in any essential sense (see WSF Statement). There is a formal acknowledgement of the plurality of views in the movement, and a rejection of any assumption of agreement on specifics, apart from the commitment to the idea that "another world is possible."

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[14] For a list of affiliated universities and high schools see http://www.workersrights.org/about/as.asp/ For a detailed list of MNCs and factories subject of WRC labor rights assessments see http://www.workersrights.org/Freports/index.asp.
[15] The text of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh can be found at http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf. A list of signatories of the Accord can be found at http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/.

Movement Success, Failure and Inclusivity

These examples illustrate that greater inclusivity can be a factor that enables greater persistence and influence for transnational social movement organizations. Because these initiatives have become more successful over time, it may seem that we should compare these initiatives to less successful initiatives. However, it is important to recognize that these examples represent the consequences of greater and lesser inclusion, as early attempts to organize failed, or were unsuccessful. A social movement's history can contain periods of failure and success to achieve cooperation among social groups and political influence. The analysis of a movement with a history that contains both failure and success may provide more analytical leverage than solely analyzing failed cases as it allows for developing a description of the complex processes by which movements succeed and fail in overcoming challenges to achieving cooperation and political influence.

The experience of the movements examined in this paper suggests that the path to cooperation and political influence may not be linear nor sequential. Over time, cooperation may break down. Backlash against early mobilization and political influence may trigger regressive policy changes. Movements that experience failures may reassess their repertoire of collective action, organizational structure, framing strategies, and internal norms in aims of changing the movement's political fate.

Moroever, social movement research may benefit from avoiding a dichotomous labeling of movements as either successful or failed. Assessing social movement influence is more complex and multidimensional than such an assessment suggests. Movements, for example, may react productively to failure, as in the case of the British suffragette movement. Staggenborg (2016, 1) notes that British suffragettes' reaction to their failure to influence the British government had a global reach and implications for the future of the international women's movement. Scholarship on environmental movements yields similar observations of the complexity of failure and a movement's reaction to it. In *Death of Environmentalism*, a reflection on the US environmental movement's failure to achieve far-reaching environmental regulation, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004, 22) argue that "[a] legislative loss can be considered a win if it has increased a movement's power, energy, and influence over the long-term."

Movements may also undermine their early success by abandoning previously effective forms of exerting influence. Bryner's (2008) study of the US environmental movement's history of political influence finds that the movement's early success in ushering in environmental policy change in the 1970s was undermined by the shift towards an interest-group centered environmental advocacy approach. Similarly, Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2004) find that an interest-group centered environmental advocacy approach in the 1990s led to the failure to build alliances with labor movement organizations that managed to block environmental protection measures that they perceived to be antithetical to labor interests. Moreover, Piven and Cloward (1979) observe that movements representing marginalized groups undermine their potential to exert political influence when they focus on building large-scale professional

organizations as momentary political opportunities pass. Successful movements may be more likely to be coopted or repressed, making longer term of final assessments more difficult.

Conclusion
In this paper we offer a theoretical approach that helps to explain why some transnational social movements have been able to organize successfully, and ultimately extract concessions from governments, corporations and international organizations, while others have foundered. We do not claim that inclusive deliberation is sufficient for such success and influence. Indeed, we agree with those scholars who point to the importance of political opportunities, mobilizing structures and other conditions that foster the emergence of these movements on the national, and likely the transnational, stage (Anner 2009; Moghadam 2009; Tarrow 1998; Joachim 1999; Smith 2008; Staggenborg 2011) . Rather, we contend that inclusive deliberation makes these movements more likely to be successful, and moves them closer to an ideal of deep poltiical solidarity, or reflective solidarity (Hancock 2011; Dean 1996). This matters because we expect that deeper solidarity is associated with more policy influence and movement success in the long term. While the cases discussed here ae suggestive that such a relationship may exist, we do not take ourselves to have proved that in this paper. Rather, we hope to have illuminated the utility of the theoretical approach we have outlined for understanding transnational social movement emergence and success, and to have pointed the way towards steps that activists and organizations can take to improve their inclusiveness and likely efficacy.

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